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  INTRODUCTION   
In the years since the landmark right to counsel case Gide-
on v. Wainwright1 was decided, numerous studies have docu-
mented the plight of indigent defendants still trying to secure 
equal treatment, effective representation and a fair trial.2 
Among other things, these studies have highlighted inadequate 
funding of indigent defense systems across the country and its 
results: the chronic appointment of “incompetent or inexperi-
enced” counsel, severe delays in the appointment of counsel, 
discontinuity of attorney representation, a lack of training and 
oversight for counsel representing indigents, excessive public 
defender caseloads and understaffing of public defender offices, 
inadequate or nonexistent expert and investigative resources 
for defense counsel, and a lack of meaningful attorney-client 
contact.3
 
 1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 In other words, they have revealed a two-tier system 
of justice in which the poor are subject to a completely separate 
and wholly underresourced experience. 
 2. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUS-
TICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED], available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf. 
 3. Id. at 7–8, 50–51, 162–65; Cara H. Drinan, Commentary, Toward a 
Federal Forum for Systemic Sixth Amendment Claims, WASH. U. L. REV. (Oct. 
22, 2008), http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/toward-a-federal-forum-for 
-systemic-sixth-amendment-claims/; see also Stephen B. Bright, Legal Repre-
sentation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 
683 passim (2010) (describing the unwillingness of state legislatures and 
courts to provide adequate resources and effectively enforce indigents’ right to 
counsel); Note, Simplicity as Equality in Criminal Procedure, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1585, 1595 (2007) (noting that the average public defender in a large 
county handles over 530 cases per year and that some public defenders handle 
up to 2000 cases annually); id. at 1595 (“[M]any states apply caps on compen-
sation for indigent defense ranging from $265 to $3,500 per case.”); Adam 
Liptak, Poor Defendants and a Drained State Budget Cross Paths in Georgia, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 6, 2010, at A13 (describing, inter alia, how budget cuts to 
Georgia’s indigent defense system have led to capital representation by attor-
neys without the time and expertise to handle a capital case and a lack of 
funding for experts or investigators); Jeff Severns Guntzel, Minnesota’s Public 
Defender Shortage, “We are fast becoming the courts of McJustice,” MINNPOST 
(Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/intelligencer/2010/10/minnesotas-
public-defender-shortage-we-are-fast-becoming-courts-mcjustice (describing 
funding problems in Minnesota’s justice system that have led to repeated at-
torney substitutions in indigent criminal case and staff cuts in public defender 
offices and the fact that the remaining public defenders are carrying twice the 
caseload recommended by the American Bar Association). See generally Mary 
Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A Na-
tional Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006) (providing an overview of how the 
funding crisis has affected indigent defense in many states). 
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Inadequate funding remains the primary obstacle to ensur-
ing that the poor receive a meaningful defense at trial or on 
appeal.4 In recent years, indigent defense systems across Amer-
ica have reached a crisis point, due in part to unprecedented 
budget shortfalls5 which, among other things, have threatened 
indigents’ access to the courts by exacerbating the problems 
listed above.6 The Justice Policy Institute observed in July 2011 
that “[p]ublic defense has been historically underfunded and 
overburdened since Gideon; however, the recent economic 
downturn and fiscal/budget crises have made it worse.”7 Yet 
this was not a wholly unanticipated possibility. In 1964, just 
one year after Gideon was decided, a commentator observed the 
effect of fiscal realities on the exercise of the right to counsel: 
“Even if Gideon v. Wainwright established an unqualified right 
to representation by counsel at trial, unavailability of funds to 
pay for costs of investigation and for the services of expert wit-
nesses still frequently frustrates the efforts of assigned counsel, 
or public defenders, and of judges to achieve justice.”8
 
 4. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 6–7 (“[I]nadequate finan-
cial support continues to be the greatest obstacle to delivering ‘competent’ and 
‘diligent’ defense representation . . . .”). 
 Unfortu-
nately, the reality that indigent defendants are promised rights 
in theory that they are denied as a matter of practice—because 
adequate funds are not made available to effectuate those 
 5. See PHIL OLIFF ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES 
CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT, 1 (2012), available at http:// 
www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf (“The Great Recession that started in 2007 
caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record . . . . [E]ven though the 
revenue outlook is trending upward, states have addressed large budget short-
falls by historical standards as they considered budgets for 2013.”). 
 6. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 59–60 (describing “the current 
funding emergency in indigent defense”); see also William Glaberson, Cuts 
Could Stall Sluggish Courts at Every Turn, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2011, at A1 
(citing The National Center for State Courts’ finding that “29 state court sys-
tems are experiencing budget reductions this year, with at least five—Georgia, 
Maine, Nevada, Oklahoma and Oregon—seeing reductions of 10 percent or 
more”). 
 7. JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-
RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 8 (2011). 
 8. Philip Fahringer, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin 
and Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REV. 394, 413 (1964) (citation omitted); see also 
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1257 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (“[T]he absence of funds to compensate lawyers prevents 
even qualified lawyers from being able to present an adequate defense.”); 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 59 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting 
that the “uneven distribution of . . . available funding” constitutes an “acute 
problem”). 
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rights—remains just as true nearly half a century after Gide-
on.9 Indeed, there is a “near-consensus that a primary rea-
son . . . for the failure to fulfill this promise [of effective assis-
tance of counsel] is a substantial lack of funding.”10
In responding to the effects of this crisis, legal advocates 
have generally based litigation reform efforts on the Sixth 
Amendment, either through post-conviction ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims made under Strickland v. Washington
  
11 
or civil class-action lawsuits alleging violations of the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.12 Because both vehicles are 
rooted in the Sixth Amendment, a claimant seeking relief must 
demonstrate that he has been prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 
conduct, or—in the case of a claimant seeking prospective re-
lief—that the lawyer or lawyers in question are likely to pro-
vide the claimant or claimants with ineffective assistance.13
This Article suggests that the Sixth Amendment’s narrow 
focus on the right to an effective lawyer is not well suited for 
reform under the current climate. Framing indigent defense 
purely as a right to counsel issue may redress the legal and 
procedural harm done to an individual criminal defendant, but 
fails to address the deeper causes of why that right is inevita-
bly violated in the context of failing indigent defense systems 
and the fact that, systemically, these failures affect only the 
poor.
  
14
 
 9. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 7, at 6 (explaining that under-
funding is a “significant barrier to providing quality public defense” and that 
although “funding has increased since Gideon, it remains insufficient” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 Not only has the Sixth Amendment become bogged down 
 10. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 332 (2d ed. 2008) (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also David A. Sklansky, 
Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1229, 1281 (2002) (“The drastic underfunding of indigent defense systems, and 
the toll it takes on the quality of representation provided to many defendants, 
have long been among the criminal justice system’s worst-kept secrets.”). 
 11. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 12. For further discussion, see Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: 
The Role of Systemic Litigation in Operationalizing The Gideon Right to Coun-
sel (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 1279185), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1279185. 
 13. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 14. For purposes of this Article, discussion will focus on those individuals 
who are defined as indigent within the legal system and thus entitled to state-
funded appointed counsel. Although during hard economic times the middle 
class struggles to secure adequate criminal representation as well—and face 
the unique dilemma of not qualifying for a public defender and yet not being 
able to afford private counsel—the treatment of that class of individuals is 
outside the scope of this Article.  
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in legal precedent making it extremely difficult for criminal de-
fendants or civil plaintiffs to obtain relief, but it suffers from 
inherent doctrinal and conceptual characteristics limiting its 
ability to do more than evaluate attorney conduct under an ob-
jective and deferential standard grounded in norms that do not 
require much of appointed lawyers. The Sixth Amendment’s fo-
cus on attorney conduct and the effect of that conduct in a giv-
en case or set of cases limits its reach—there is always the re-
quirement that an alleged deprivation of resources be filtered 
through counsel to determine its effect. As a result, the Sixth 
Amendment approach can never directly address issues of ac-
cess or funding. Relying on the Sixth Amendment leaves us 
chipping away at a much greater underlying problem armed 
only with a tool that has lost much of its force. And without 
making any headway as to the underlying problem—inequality 
of resources—it is unlikely that any success reformers achieve 
will apply with equal force to all defendants. 
In response, this Article suggests a return to the roots of 
the fundamental right of access to justice, born from Griffin v. 
Illinois15 and its progeny. In those cases, the Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of equality and that every criminal 
defendant, rich or poor, must receive a meaningful defense.16
Courts and legal reformers should refocus on the salience 
of equality in the access to justice context because of its doctri-
nal applicability to an underfunded justice system lacking sub-
stantive standards for indigent representation. By reframing 
the harm done by indigent defense failures—i.e., the creation of 
a two-tiered system that subjugates poor criminal defendants 
and frustrates universal rights enforcement—we can create 
more tailored remedies and evolve doctrine in a manner that is 
 In 
doing so, the Court was able to reach aspects of indigent crimi-
nal representation that would not have been possible under a 
strict Sixth Amendment approach—necessary elements of a de-
fense which support or reach beyond the lawyer herself—and 
ensure that defendants of all means have access to such re-
sources. The fact that this strain of equality has survived other 
cutbacks on equal protection doctrine allows indigent defense 
advocates to reclaim it as a basis for reform.  
 
 15. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 17–18 (“In criminal trials a state can no more discrimi-
nate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race or color. Plainly 
the ability to pay costs in advance . . . could not be used as an excuse to de-
prive a defendant of a fair trial.”). 
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more cognizant of the practical enforcement of rights. Focusing 
on equality in addition to the vindication of individual rights 
also integrates a distinct set of norms and societal values into 
the narrative of indigent defense reform and allows us to attack 
the roots of the problem rather than slowly chipping away at 
existing inequalities built upon that foundation. 
Part I of the Article describes in more detail the dominant 
Sixth Amendment approach to protecting indigent defendants’ 
right to effective counsel and the doctrinal shortcomings and 
limitations of that approach, including its exclusive focus on 
the lawyer’s role, its reliance on a body of restrictive past prec-
edent, and the inability to directly address issues of underfund-
ing or to prospectively set substantive standards for attorney 
conduct.  
Part II provides a brief history of equal protection as it re-
lates to indigent defense, with a focus on the cases that form 
the basis for protecting indigent defendants’ right of access to 
the courts, including Griffin and Douglas v. California.17
Part III of the Article describes the conceptual and doctri-
nal advantages of an approach based in equal protection. It re-
frames the central principle of indigent defense reform as equal 
access and not the effectiveness of the lawyering provided, al-
lowing us to focus on the systemic deprivation of resources ra-
ther than on the effect of such resources on “reasonable” attor-
ney conduct.  
 The 
Article posits that although equal protection doctrine has been 
limited in certain respects over the last half century, the core 
principles established in Griffin and its progeny are still viable 
despite subsequent legal developments. 
An approach grounded in equality focuses on differential 
treatment between groups and recognizes systemic harm, in 
contrast to the Sixth Amendment approach, which is focused on 
the vindication of individual substantive rights.18
 
 17. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 It also allows 
us to expand our understanding of the problem to focus not on-
ly on a lawyer failing in his representation of an indigent client, 
but on the bigger picture of the resources that are necessary to 
a meaningful defense in every case, such as reasonable attor-
ney workloads and adequate investigative and expert re-
sources. Focusing on the lawyer alone will be a futile exercise 
unless we provide the attorney with the support she needs to do 
 18. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85. 
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her job effectively. Relying on an equal protection approach al-
lows courts to prospectively define the elements that constitute 
a meaningful defense, rather than relying on a retrospective 
reasonableness approach. And, by removing the requirement 
that resources are relevant only insofar as they directly influ-
ence attorney conduct, an equal protection paradigm simplifies 
the relationship between resource deprivation and constitu-
tional injury and facilitates a more direct path to necessary 
normative judgments about what tools must be made available 
to defendants dependent on the state for their defense. Perhaps 
most significant, an approach that focuses on equal access 
draws our attention to deeper inequalities that influence, 
among other things, the quality of representation available to 
poor defendants, highlights why a singular focus on across the 
board rights enforcement fails in the midst of fiscal constraint, 
and targets remedies on assisting the most disadvantaged. 
Ultimately, the Article concludes that while the Sixth 
Amendment plays an important role in protecting every de-
fendant’s right to an effective attorney, it does little to recog-
nize or address the obstacles preventing the practical enforce-
ment of that right, particularly those of a fiscal nature. When 
indigent defense systems fail, it is not everyone who is harmed, 
but only those whose sole recourse for legal representation is to 
rely on public defense. Therefore, to effectively address such 
failures, we must look beyond universal substantive rights en-
forcement, which often assumes that all defendants stand on 
equal footing, to other approaches, like equal protection, which 
consciously ensure that poor defendants are not treated differ-
ently or afforded less than their wealthier counterparts. 
By presenting equal protection as a meaningful alternative 
to Sixth Amendment arguments in the context of indigent de-
fense, this Article does not suggest that consideration of equal 
protection will prompt an immediate doctrinal shift on the part 
of the Supreme Court or lead to radically different litigation 
outcomes. Nor does it suggest that the Sixth Amendment lacks 
value or a significant place in the context of indigent defense. 
But, it is meant to suggest that the dominant means for litiga-
tion reform to date—the Sixth Amendment—is fundamentally 
limited in its capacity19
 
 19. Id. at 689 (“The purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, alt-
hough that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system.”). 
 and that a return to equal protection 
principles may not only shift the evolution of doctrine and gen-
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erate more effective solutions, but also initiate a conceptual 
shift that has the capacity to influence both societal and legal 
norms and current discourse about indigent defense. 
I.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
APPROACH   
Over the past several decades, indigent defendants have 
used two primary vehicles to vindicate their right to an ade-
quate defense, both of which typically rely on the Sixth 
Amendment: post-conviction claims asserting a violation under 
Strickland v. Washington and civil lawsuits alleging systemic 
right to counsel violations.20
This Article highlights several of these limitations: First, 
the Sixth Amendment’s exclusive focus on attorney perfor-
mance (and, under Strickland, the prejudice stemming from 
such conduct)
 Although both vehicles have led to 
isolated victories, the Sixth Amendment suffers from several 
doctrinal limitations that prevent it from functioning as an ef-
fective tool for indigent defense reform, particularly in the cur-
rent climate where funding presents the largest obstacle to re-
form. 
21 often renders the underallocation of resources 
irrelevant and certainly not dispositive. The Sixth Amendment 
is not designed to account for resource disparities or the misal-
location of resources behind systemic failures; therefore, it can-
not directly address issues of funding. To the extent the provi-
sion of resources is relevant, the analysis is dependent upon 
linking claims based on the underprovision of resources with 
counsel’s performance.22 Having to filter resource constraints 
through the medium of attorney effectiveness allows for other 
variables—for example, an individual attorney’s strategic 
choices—to distort the analysis.23
 
 20. For a proposed model for federal habeas review that could be used to 
address systemic claims, see Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Ha-
beas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 Second, Sixth Amendment 
 21. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691–96 (focusing on the requirement that 
the defendant show prejudice).  
 22. Although some courts have held the Strickland standard inapplicable 
to prospective Sixth Amendment claims alleging systemic deficiencies, obviat-
ing the need to demonstrate actual prejudice, see infra Part I.E, there is still a 
burden under these claims to demonstrate the likelihood that a defendant or 
defendants will be denied the right to effective counsel. 
 23. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 10, at 1282 (“[M]istakes and omissions 
by defense counsel are excused as ‘strategic decisions’ or ‘isolated’ errors—or 
not even addressed, because the reviewing court finds evidence of guilty so 
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analysis provides for an objective, neutral inquiry that does not 
distinguish between those defendants with means and those 
without; yet the harm created by conditions like those dis-
cussed immediately above are inflicted primarily on those who 
are subjected to underfunded public defense systems. A Sixth 
Amendment approach is therefore not equipped to facilitate 
more targeted solutions that specifically address existing ine-
qualities between groups of defendants. The emphasis on an ob-
jective “reasonableness” inquiry also prevents courts from pre-
scribing specific guidelines regarding what is required of 
counsel and prospectively defining what “effective” assistance 
means. Third, Strickland’s prejudice requirement means that 
certain external factors within the criminal case may override 
any potential relevance of underfunding. If a criminal defend-
ant’s overwhelming guilt can override even the most egregious 
attorney deficiencies, surely it can also render irrelevant the 
underallocation of resources. Fourth, the sheer amount of prec-
edent counseling towards a finding that counsel was effective in 
any given case renders the Sixth Amendment approach an un-
likely candidate for relief, let alone reform. 
A. NO PLACE FOR FUNDING 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland, a post-conviction defendant must show that his 
counsel’s performance was deficient and that, but for such defi-
cient conduct, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.24 Due to Strickland’s exclusive focus on attorney per-
formance, claims made under Strickland do not provide a good 
vehicle to address funding inequalities or the failure to ade-
quately resource appointed counsel.25
 
strong that there is no ‘reasonable probability’ that any deficiencies in the de-
fendant’s representation affected the verdict.”). 
 If the attorney’s perfor-
mance is ultimately found objectively unreasonable, the level of 
resources made available to that lawyer is irrelevant. Likewise, 
if the attorney’s performance is found constitutionally sufficient 
 24. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 25. See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Un-
derfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (2005) 
(“[T]he Strickland standard is not structured to accommodate an argument 
related to funding.”); see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 129–30 (noting 
the difficulty of achieving systemic indigent defense reform through post-
conviction litigation in part because of the prejudice requirement (and the rar-
ity of a finding that prejudice will be presumed) and also the unlikelihood that 
such litigation will ultimately succeed). 
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in any given case, it is of no consequence that her office is se-
verely underfunded or that other cases on her docket may have 
suffered as a result. As William Stuntz has observed:  
[N]othing in the law of criminal procedure regulates how much states 
must spend on lawyers for defendants. This too is a consequence of 
ineffective assistance doctrine. In order to make out an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show, first, that his 
lawyer failed to provide constitutionally adequate assistance in his 
case and, second, that this failure may well have caused the defend-
ant to lose his case. This test rules out claims based on inadequate re-
sources. If defense counsel did indeed fail to provide constitutionally 
adequate assistance, the state’s pay scale is irrelevant—the defendant 
wins no matter how well or poorly counsel was paid. If, on the other 
hand, defense counsel met the constitutional performance standard, 
the state’s pay scale is again irrelevant—the defendant loses regard-
less of attorney pay because he got what the Sixth Amendment guar-
antees him: constitutionally adequate representation. This doctrinal 
box explains why very few cases even address the question whether 
states’ compensation of appointed counsel can give rise to a constitu-
tional claim. Existing law simply leaves no room for the claim.26
Although the above example focuses on attorney compen-
sation—which might be more relevant under a Sixth Amend-
ment analysis, given its more direct connection to attorney per-
formance—the same is just as true for other resources, such as 
investigators, sophisticated forensic analyses, or overall office 
funding allowing for reasonable caseloads, which may not be 
provided to indigent defendants or their counsel by the state.
 
27 
By focusing on attorney performance and requiring a showing 
of prejudice stemming from such performance, there is even 
less room to consider resources not directly tied to the attor-
ney’s role that may prevent an indigent defendant from receiv-
ing an adequate defense.28 For example, it is unclear how dep-
rivation of the trial transcript at issue in Griffin could have 
been addressed through a Sixth Amendment analysis alone.29
 
 26. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Proce-
dure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 
 27. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 129 (noting that in State v. 
Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984), the court found indigent defense services 
defective in part because the county relied on low-bid contract attorneys to pay 
for their own investigative services, reducing the chances that an investigator 
would actually be used). 
 28. Cf. Stuntz, supra note 26, at 21 (arguing that Strickland excludes 
claims based on inadequate resources). 
 29. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 14–15, 19 (1956) (holding that the 
failure to provide trial transcripts to indigent defendants who could not oth-
erwise afford them violated equal protection). 
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To the extent resources are taken into consideration under 
a Sixth Amendment analysis, they must be filtered through the 
attorney medium. In other words, a defendant alleging a 
Strickland claim would have to show how the deprivation of re-
sources affected his attorney’s performance.30 This allows for 
intervening factors—such as the deference to strategic deci-
sions that may justify a lawyer’s conduct or an individual law-
yer’s exceptional talents—to affect the ultimate analysis.31 It 
can also be difficult to generalize how different factors may af-
fect different attorneys—for reasons based on individual attor-
ney skill and experience or the resources available to that at-
torney.32 By deferring to counsel’s strategic reasons for making 
certain choices or failing to undertake certain tasks33
 
 30. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691–66 (1984) (outlining 
the prejudice requirement of the Sixth Amendment’s test for ineffective assis-
tance). 
—
combined with the need of many lawyers who are alleged to be 
ineffective to defend their prior actions or decisions regardless 
of their merit—Strickland cedes power from the courts to the 
very lawyers whose effectiveness is being challenged. 
 31. See Stuntz, supra note 26, at 22 (asserting that the law affords de-
fense counsel to act on his discretion). 
 32. Cf. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 129 (explaining that the defense 
system was ineffective due to the county failing to take into account the num-
ber of cases, type of cases, the experience of the attorney, or time required for 
each case). 
 33. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic 
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to 
the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investi-
gations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investi-
gate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, ap-
plying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 690–91; see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (“In Strickland we 
said that [j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s performance must be highly deferen-
tial and that every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, 
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Thus . . . 
when a court is presented with an ineffective-assistance claim . . . a defendant 
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 
action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
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B. THE OBJECTIVE “REASONABLENESS” STANDARD 
Under a Sixth Amendment analysis, counsel’s conduct is 
evaluated under an objective reasonableness standard.34 Strick-
land specifically prohibits a more forward looking approach, by 
which courts could promulgate prospective guidelines for coun-
sel’s conduct or specific requirements for effective assistance: 
“More specific guidelines are not appropriate . . . . The proper 
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonable-
ness under prevailing professional norms.”35 The Strickland 
Court made clear that the purpose of the ineffectiveness in-
quiry was not to improve the quality of legal representation or 
to specify particular requirements for ineffective assistance.36
Given the Court’s failure and unwillingness to develop or 
apply more defined standards, the analysis of Strickland claims 
is highly subjective and the definition of what constitutes inef-
fective assistance of counsel can and does change on a case-by-
case basis.
  
37 As Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out in his 
dissenting opinion in Strickland, part of the problem with the 
assessment of ineffective assistance as the Court defined the 
inquiry is that the Court “instructed judges called upon to as-
sess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their 
own intuitions regarding what constitutes ‘professional’ repre-
sentation, and has discouraged them from trying to develop 
more detailed standards governing the performance of defense 
counsel.”38
 
 34. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88 (finding that a convicted defendant al-
leging ineffective counsel must show that the representation by counsel failed 
the objective standard of reasonableness). 
 Another problem with relying on “reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms” is that the norm may it-
 35. Id. at 688.  
 36. Id. at 686, 688; see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of 
Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to Presume Prejudice 
From Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 839 & n.81 (2003). In 
his dissenting opinion in Strickland, Justice Marshall took issue with this 
characterization of the right to counsel, challenging the notion that the pur-
pose of the right to counsel is “only . . . to ‘reduce the chance that innocent per-
sons will be convicted.’” 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“My objec-
tion to the performance standard adopted by the Court is that it is so mallea-
ble that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive var-
iation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and 
applied by different courts. To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel 
for a criminal defendant must behave ‘reasonably’ and must act like ‘a reason-
ably competent attorney’ is to tell them almost nothing.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 38. Id. at 708. 
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self be anemic—i.e., the norm may incorporate the existing lack 
of funding to the extent practicing lawyers are laboring under 
such conditions.39
Justice Marshall’s fears have been realized in lower courts’ 
application of Strickland. Although the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) and other national organizations have set forth spe-
cific standards by which a lawyer’s conduct should be evaluat-
ed,
  
40 courts have been willing to allow much shoddier lawyering 
to pass muster under the Strickland analysis.41 And although 
in cases like Wiggins v. Smith the Supreme Court used the 
ABA Guidelines to provide a benchmark for what may consti-
tute reasonable performance,42 it has more recently demon-
strated a renewed unwillingness to be confined to specific 
standards in assessing ineffectiveness.43
 
 39. See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1454–55 (1999) (explaining that many of the 
lawyers routinely providing representation to indigent defendants—and par-
ticularly capital defendants—are often not the best nor the most experienced). 
 
 40. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003) [here-
inafter ABA GUIDELINES], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines 
.authcheckdam.pdf (providing a national standard of practice for the defense 
of capital cases in order to ensure that all capital defendants have a high qual-
ity of representation); AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002) [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES] available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/administrative/legal_aid_ 
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf 
(noting that the supplied Principles should be used to assess the public de-
fense delivery system); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, (3d 
ed. 1992) [hereinafter PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/ 
crimjust_standards_defsvcs_toc.html (asserting in Standard 5-1.1 that the ob-
jective of providing counsel is to assure that all persons eligible for counsel are 
afforded quality legal representation); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, 
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES (1976); see also 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (applying ABA Guidelines in as-
sessing counsel’s conduct); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89 (“Prevailing norms 
of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . 
are guides to determining what is reasonable.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 41. See infra Part I.D. 
 42. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522 (applying ABA Guidelines when assessing 
counsel’s conduct). 
 43. See, e.g., Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. 13, 17 (2009) (emphasizing 
that the Guidelines are “‘only guides’ to what reasonableness means, not its 
definition” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)); id. at 20 (Alito, J. concur-
ring) (contesting the notion that the Guidelines have “special relevance in de-
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Related to the objective nature of the Strickland inquiry is 
the fact that it does not distinguish between defendants with 
means and those without; it applies in equal force to defend-
ants with appointed counsel and defendants with retained 
counsel.44 Although this neutral quality of Strickland may ap-
pear to treat both groups of defendants equally, in practice it 
results in an inability to develop remedies that will help those 
who are most in need. Strickland assumes a universe in which 
every lawyer is equally positioned and is unable to distinguish 
between those lawyers who simply made poor decisions or 
demonstrated incompetence and those who were forced into 
their decisions by a lack of necessary resources.45 That distinc-
tion is critical for any defendant who has demonstrated error 
under Strickland and is therefore entitled to reversal and a 
new trial.46
C. THE POST-CONVICTION PREJUDICE PROBLEM 
 For the poor defendant subjected to a failing indi-
gent defense system, and who is, as a result of his victory, sent 
back into the same underresourced system, the prescribed rem-
edy may be of little value.  
Perhaps the greatest obstacle facing defendants raising a 
post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that 
they must show, under the Strickland standard, that there is a 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.”47
 
termining whether an attorney’s performance meets the standard required by 
the Sixth Amendment”). 
 The prejudice prong is a critical part of the Strickland 
analysis because of the Supreme Court’s position that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is meant to ensure a fair outcome: 
since the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is “to ensure a fair 
 44. “An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained 
or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685; Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985) (“[T]he 
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel at trial applies to 
every criminal prosecution, without regard to whether counsel is retained or 
appointed.”). 
 45. Cf. Stuntz, supra note 26, at 20–21 (arguing that the ineffective assis-
tance doctrine includes low activity by defense counsel, making it difficult to 
separate low activity but good representation from incompetent representa-
tion); see also id. at 21 (asserting that the Strickland standard does not apply 
to claims based on inadequate resources). 
 46. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (noting that a successful ineffective 
assistance claim requires reversal of defendant’s conviction or death sentence). 
 47. Id. at 694.  
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trial . . . [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffective-
ness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial can-
not be relied on as having a just result.”48
Because the right to effective counsel was derived from the 
Due Process Clause as well as the Sixth Amendment, it shares 
the doctrinal limitations characteristic of other due process 
rights.
  
49 In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Justice Antonin 
Scalia explained that early cases defining the right to counsel 
as the right to the effective assistance of counsel were based on 
the Due Process Clause’s entitlements to a fair trial and just 
results.50
Having derived the right to effective representation from the purpose 
of ensuring a fair trial, we have, logically enough, also derived the 
limits of that right from that same purpose . . . . The requirement that 
a defendant show prejudice in effective representation cases arises 
from the very nature of the specific element of the right to counsel at 
issue there—effective (not mistake-free) representation. Counsel can-
not be ‘ineffective’ unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, 
at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not 
‘complete’ until the defendant is prejudiced.
 Elaborating further, he wrote:  
51
Under certain circumstances—like those discussed in Unit-
ed States v. Cronic
 
52—prejudice is presumed, eliminating the 
need for the defendant to prove prejudice. For example, the ac-
tual or constructive denial of counsel results in a presumption 
of prejudice.53
 
 48. Id. at 686 (emphasis added). 
 Actual denial of counsel may include situations 
where counsel is absent altogether, where counsel is prevented 
(by the government) from providing assistance during a critical 
stage of the proceeding or where the government actively inter-
 49. Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance 
of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 16 (2009) (“[T]he tests developed by the 
lower courts for measuring effective assistance of counsel incorporated a sig-
nificant doctrinal element inherent in a due process analysis: a requirement 
that defendants demonstrate prejudice.”). 
 50. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (referring 
to McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) and Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). 
 51. Id. at 147 (citations omitted). 
 52. 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (explaining that certain circumstances can 
lead to a presumption of ineffectiveness, eliminating the need for further in-
quiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial). 
 53. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–60 (describing circumstances warranting a 
presumption of ineffectiveness); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (“Actual or con-
structive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to 
result in prejudice.”). 
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feres with defense counsel’s ability to conduct the defense.54 
Constructive denial of counsel may occur where “counsel entire-
ly fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adver-
sarial testing.”55 Prejudice may also be presumed under circum-
stances where “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully 
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small 
that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry 
into the actual conduct of the trial.”56 Cronic makes clear, how-
ever, that prejudice will not be presumed where counsel has 
made several missteps, even significant ones; instead, counsel’s 
failure must be “complete.”57
Ultimately, the relief granted under this framework of pre-
sumed prejudice has been relatively rare, even more so than 
under a more traditional Strickland analysis.
 
58 In one infamous 
case, the defendant’s lawyer slept through parts of the trial and 
yet a panel of judges on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit refused to apply a presumption of prejudice 
under Cronic.59
 
 54. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; see also Per-
ry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989). Examples of such state interference may 
include preventing attorney and client from consulting during an overnight 
recess, see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976), or barring defense 
counsel from making a summation at a bench trial, see Herring v. New York, 
422 U.S. 853, 864–65 (1975). 
 It has also proven ineffective as a means for 
 55. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
 56. Id. at 659–60. 
 57. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696–97 (2002) (explaining that counsel’s 
failure to oppose the prosecution at several junctures would be insufficient; 
rather, counsel must have “failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the 
sentencing proceeding as a whole”). 
 58. Because courts are hesitant to apply Cronic and are instead much 
more likely to apply a Strickland analysis, the “requirements for presuming 
prejudice under Cronic are remarkably undeveloped.” Keith Cunningham-
Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to 
Presume Prejudice From Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 831–
32 (2003); see also id. at 831 (explaining that “[f]or the most part, courts have 
not embraced Cronic”). “Therefore, while Cronic provides a viable avenue 
through which courts can invalidate convictions when defense attorneys mani-
fest especially egregious conduct, it serves as the exception rather than the 
rule, leaving Strickland as virtually the sole standard for evaluating attorney 
competence.” Ryan Riehl, Note, Double-Talking the Right to Counsel, 50 
WAYNE L. REV. 1019, 1029 (2004). 
 59. An en banc opinion of the Fifth Circuit later reversed the panel’s deci-
sion, granting the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. James M. Donovan, 
Burdine v. Johnson–To Sleep, Perchance to Get a New Trial: Presumed Preju-
dice Arising from Sleeping Counsel, 47 LOY. L. REV. 1585, 1587 (2001); see also 
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional 
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Require-
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addressing systemic flaws that inevitably result in the con-
structive denial of counsel, such as counsel lacking critical re-
sources or overwhelmed by unmanageable caseloads. As recent-
ly as April 2009, a report issued by the National Right to 
Counsel Committee of the Constitution Project observed that 
“[w]e are unaware of any cases in which a court has ruled, 
based expressly upon analogy to Cronic, that excessive case-
loads render it so unlikely that even a competent lawyer could 
be expected to render effective assistance that prejudice to cli-
ents should be presumed.”60
The difficulty of focusing on outcomes or the potential prej-
udice to an individual defendant’s case is three-fold. First, an 
analysis requiring a finding of prejudice will necessitate specu-
lation that is always subject to subjective assessment or inter-
pretation.
  
61
Second, focusing on the prejudice that has stemmed from a 
lawyer’s inadequate counsel allows a variety of other more ex-
ternal factors to be taken into account, including the evidence 
against the accused.
 It is difficult to assess how a different legal presen-
tation may have affected the fact finder’s verdict, and—given 
the policy decision to favor finality—courts in doubt are more 
likely to assume that a different action on the lawyer’s part 
would not have affected the ultimate conclusion. 
62 Under the current inquiry, if there ap-
pears to be clear evidence of a defendant’s guilt or—in the capi-
tal context—if the defendant’s crime is so egregious such that 
no amount of mitigating evidence could have convinced the jury 
to choose a life sentence, he would be permitted the worst law-
yering possible, given that any degree of lawyering arguably 
could not overcome the evidence against him.63
 
ment, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–63 (1996) (discussing cases in which courts 
concluded that counsel was effective under Strickland and Cronic despite fact 
that counsel was sleeping or under influence of drugs or alcohol during trial). 
 In that sense, 
 60. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 111 n.29. 
 61. See, e.g., Klein supra note 39, at 1467 (asserting that the transcript 
does “not reflect what ought to have and would have been done by counsel” if 
counsel had been competent (emphasis omitted)). 
 62. Conversely, it is also possible that, by virtue of a lawyer’s ineffective-
ness, there is evidence that will not be taken into account: “[E]vidence of inju-
ry to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the 
incompetence of defense counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Klein, supra note 39, at 1467 (ex-
plaining that the “record may not reveal weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case 
because of counsel’s incompetence”). 
 63. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Klein, supra note 
39, at 1467 (noting that since Strickland, courts “may find that when the pros-
  
1214 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1197 
 
Strickland provides the least protection to those accused of 
committing the most serious crimes—where the stakes are 
highest—yet, these are the instances where a good lawyer is 
most needed.64
Third, focusing on the lawyer’s conduct (and the harm 
stemming from such conduct) takes an overly narrow view of 
the violations occurring within the system and assumes that 
injury only occurs when an indigent defendant is dealt an ad-
verse outcome.
 It would be preferable, from a rights perspec-
tive, not to maintain a “no harm, no foul” system of redress; 
there is an independent interest in keeping the playing field 
level, regardless of who wins and who loses. 
65 There is an independent interest that is vio-
lated when an indigent defendant is deprived of a competent 
and qualified lawyer at a critical stage of the criminal proceed-
ing.66 But, the preference to favor finality in the post-conviction 
context stands in the way of making that harm cognizable.67
D. BAD PRECEDENT 
 
Post-conviction defendants claiming that they have re-
ceived ineffective assistance at trial face an extremely high bar 
to relief. Although there have been occasional meritorious 
claims, the vast majority of ineffective assistance claims are 
 
ecutor’s case is strong, the verdict would have been a guilty one regardless of 
how effective counsel’s representation was”). 
 64. See Klein, supra note 39, at 1467 (noting that it is “the defendant con-
fronted with the strongest case against him who is the most in need of a com-
petent, aggressive, and effective defense”). 
 65. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 129 (stating that even if system-
ic deficiencies are acknowledged, the deficiencies rarely lead to “a presumption 
of prejudice”). 
 66. Cf. Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009), aff'd on 
other grounds 780 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2010), and reconsideration granted, or-
der vacated, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010), and order vacated on reconsidera-
tion, 790 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 2010), and order reinstated, 790 N.W.2d 695 
(Mich. 2010), and rev’d, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010), and order vacated on re-
consideration, 790 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 2010) (holding in the context of a class-
action civil suit seeking prospective relief that “when it is shown that court-
appointed counsel’s representation falls below an objective standard of reason-
ableness with respect to a critical stage in the proceedings, there has been an 
invasion of a legally protected interest and harm occurs”). 
 67. Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts 
for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1822–23 (2000) (“[W]hen the 
right to counsel is invoked in order to overturn a criminal conviction, concerns 
about finality and judicial economy compel a narrow understanding of effec-
tive assistance of counsel, one in which the facial reliability of the conviction 
outweighs considerations of the requirements of a fair trial.”).  
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unsuccessful.68 Both federal and state courts have allowed 
egregious instances of lawyering to pass muster as effective 
counsel, leading one commentator to note that “[b]y failing to 
‘proscribe second-class performances by counsel,’ the Court has 
led us down a path which has constitutionalized the inade-
quate, incompetent, ineffective assistance of counsel.”69
The Strickland standard has proved virtually impossible to meet. 
Courts have declined to find ineffective assistance where defense 
counsel slept during portions of the trial, where counsel used heroin 
and cocaine throughout the trial, where counsel allowed his client to 
wear the same sweatshirt and shoes in court that the perpetrator was 
alleged to have worn on the day of the crime, where counsel stated 
prior to trial that he was not prepared on the law or the facts of the 
case, and where counsel appointed in a capital case could not name a 
single Supreme Court decision on the death penalty.
 Another 
author has summarized the extent to which courts have failed 
to enforce the Sixth Amendment under Strickland: 
70
The precedent developed in the years after Strickland was de-
cided has set a high bar for ineffectiveness and has allowed 
courts to apply a weak interpretation to the Sixth Amend-
ment’s right to counsel.
 
71 Moreover, the additional layer of def-
erence given to state courts a decade and a half ago by the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) has made 
obtaining relief through federal habeas nearly impossible.72
 
 68. See Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense 
Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 5, 33 (noting that 
“ineffective assistance of counsel claims are difficult to win” and that “the vast 
majority of individuals pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are 
unsuccessful”); see also Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and Af-
ter-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6 
(“Judges almost never reverse convictions for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel”); Klein, supra note 
 As 
39, at 1471 (citing a 1995 study of nine states and the 
corresponding federal district courts revealing that the courts granted “only 
one percent or fewer of the claims of ineffective assistance”); Sklansky, supra 
note 10, at 1282 (noting that the requirements of Strickland “have proven al-
most impossible to meet”). 
 69. Klein, supra note 39, at 1479. 
 70. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 78–79 (1999); see also Stephen B. 
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But 
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1841 n.45, 1843 (1994) (providing 
numerous examples of ineffective assistance of counsel and egregious attorney 
conduct not found to violate the Sixth Amendment). 
 71. See Stuntz, supra note 26, at 6 (“[I]neffective assistance doctrine tol-
erates a very low activity level by defense attorneys.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5–6, 36 n.247 (2009) (noting the decline of 
federal habeas petitions granted and that “AEDPA and other hurdles have 
made it harder for federal judges to grant habeas relief”). 
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a result of the high number of cases finding subpar lawyering 
to pass constitutional muster and the limited ability of federal 
courts post-AEDPA to develop the law, the right to counsel has 
become fairly entrenched in limiting precedent, and it may be 
difficult to unmoor the right to make it susceptible to more ex-
pansive application. 
E. PRE-CONVICTION INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIMS 
Separate mention should be made of civil pre-conviction 
claims, which differ in nature from traditional Strickland 
claims made post-conviction. Criminal defendants seeking to 
allege that their counsel are ineffective may also attempt to do 
so pre-conviction.73 Pre-conviction ineffectiveness claims made 
in the criminal context are relatively rare and have been 
deemed cognizable with little frequency;74 these claims are of-
ten viewed by courts as reserved for post-conviction review.75
 
 73. Some defendants have made pre-conviction criminal claims of ineffec-
tive assistance with an eye toward achieving systemic reform. See, e.g., State 
v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (raising Sixth Amendment claim in a pre-
trial motion during the course of an individual criminal prosecution). To the 
extent defendants in this procedural posture claim, for example, that counsel’s 
lack of adequate compensation violates the Sixth Amendment, the analysis 
appears relatively similar to the pre-conviction civil claims discussed infra, in 
that there must a showing that the under-compensation will likely result in a 
denial of Sixth Amendment rights. See, e.g., State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138, 141 
(N.M. 2007) (holding, in reliance on Cronic, that “[t]he inadequacy of compen-
sation in this case makes it unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective 
assistance, and therefore . . . ineffectiveness is properly presumed without in-
quiry into actual performance”). 
 
 74. As of 2007, there had been just one successful documented case of a 
prospective Strickland claim (even though Strickland was decided in 1984). 
See Robin Adler, Enforcing the Right to Counsel: Can the Courts Do It? The 
Failure of Systemic Reform Litigation, 2007 J. INST. JUST. & INT'L STUD. 59, 
61; see also, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1334 
(M.D. Ala. 2005) (finding pre-conviction ineffectiveness claim premature); cf. 
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 112–28 (discussing several pre-conviction 
civil cases filed post-2007—some of which were still pending at the time of the 
report’s publication—and also other cases that were resolved by consent de-
cree or settlement agreement). 
 75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002) (inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims should be raised on collateral review); 
Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding pre-conviction 
ineffectiveness claims unreviewable); Collins v. State, 477 N.W.2d 374, 376 
(Iowa 1991) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims more properly considered 
in post-conviction proceedings to allow for development of record of counsel’s 
performance); see also Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Review-
ing Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims in State and Federal 
Postconviction Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 6, 10 (noting that “a 
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Therefore, this section will focus on pre-conviction ineffective-
ness claims made in the civil context. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserted by indi-
vidual defendants, whether pre- or post-conviction, are often 
examples of a systemic failure to provide the indigent with an 
adequate defense. In response to that reality, civil advocates 
have attempted to use other vehicles to secure reform of the 
system as a whole. A commonly used means for obtaining 
structural reform in this context is for indigent defendants—
often banded together as a class—to assert through a civil law-
suit that the indigent defense system at issue is so 
underresourced or so otherwise flawed as to violate the Sixth 
Amendment rights of any defendant subject to that system.76
Although not uniformly resolved, some courts have held 
that defendants seeking to obtain systemic or structural indi-
gent defense reform by filing civil suit—pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, for example—are not subject to the Strickland inquiry 
because they are attempting to show a need for prospective en-
forcement (i.e., that counsel will perform ineffectively in the fu-
ture) rather than making a retrospective argument post-
conviction.
 
77
 
majority of states require defendants to raise ineffectiveness challenges in 
state post-conviction proceedings”). 
 Because civil plaintiffs making such claims are of-
ten seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, in assessing such 
claims, courts typically assess “the likelihood of substantial and 
immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies 
 76. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 112–17 (providing examples of 
class-action litigation seeking injunctive relief for indigent defendants). 
 77. See Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequali-
ty and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 238 & n.102 
(2010) (“[A] class action that seeks prospective relief rather than the overturn-
ing of a conviction need not meet the Strickland test.”); see also Luckey v. Har-
ris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[The Strickland] standard is inap-
propriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief.”); Simmons v. State Pub. 
Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Iowa 2010) (“In cases involving systemic or 
structural challenges . . . [w]hat is required is a showing that the structural 
feature being challenged threatens or is likely to impair realization of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.”). But see, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. 
Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 831 (Kan. 1987) (“While the system thus creates the po-
tential for ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no specific evidence in the 
record here of any deficient performance that adversely affected the outcome 
of a trial. . . . Simply because the system could result in the appointment of 
ineffective counsel is not sufficient reason to declare the system unconstitu-
tional; those rare cases where counsel has been ineffective may be handled 
and determined individually by the appellate courts.” (citation omitted) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984))). 
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at law.”78 So, although plaintiffs in this posture need not show 
actual harm stemming from the state’s failure to provide con-
stitutionally adequate representation,79 they must show the 
imminent risk of harm in the future, in the form of potentially 
diminished attorney effectiveness.80
Although the standard applied to these claims is more open 
than Strickland’s case-by-case post hoc analysis to the possibil-
ity of systemic reform, they are—by their nature as Sixth 
Amendment allegations—focused specifically on the lawyer’s 
role and on only those rights that have been specifically deline-
ated under Sixth Amendment case law
 
81 (they are also indirect-
ly cabined by the bad precedent in the area of right to counsel, 
as described above).82 Moreover, many of these cases have been 
unable to get at the qualitative aspects of ineffective assistance; 
rather they have focused on a deprivation of resources leading 
to the complete denial of counsel, meaning that no lawyer is 
present at all.83
 
 78. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 
502 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 In the event that the quality (and not mere ex-
 79. See Simmons, 791 N.W.2d at 77 (“[A] showing of ‘actual prejudice’ in a 
particular case is arguably not applicable; instead, what is required is a show-
ing that the structural feature being challenged threatens or is likely to impair 
realization of the right to effective assistance of counsel.”). 
 80. In other words, the plaintiff seeking pre-conviction equitable relief 
must show that his or her “constitutional right to counsel is being denied or 
will be denied because some aspect of the provision of indigent defense ser-
vices makes it unlikely that any attorney could provide effective representa-
tion under the circumstances.” JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 112.  
 81. Emily Chiang, Indigent Defense Invigorated: A Uniform Standard for 
Adjudicating Pre-Conviction Sixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 443, 451–56 (2010). But see id. at 474 (explaining that “[e]vidence 
of systemic shortcomings in the jurisdiction—such as violations of guidelines, 
checklists, or administrative standards on issues like caseloads, training, or 
access to investigators—is relevant insofar as it demonstrates the probability 
of harm that indigent criminal defendants face, but such probabilistic evidence 
does not in and of itself constitute constitutional injury”). 
  For a discussion of how the Court’s recent application of the Sixth 
Amendment to the pre-trial context may create more opportunities to demon-
strate injury in the context of structural ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Unintended Consequences: The Impact of 
the Court's Recent Cases on Structural Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 106 (2012). 
 82. See supra Part I.D. 
 83. See, e.g., Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 
N.E.2d 895, 899–900 (Mass. 2004) (addressing situation in which low compen-
sation resulted in shortage of attorneys which led to indigent defendants being 
without representation); N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n. v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 
397, 399–400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (addressing statutory fee caps on attorney 
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istence) of representation is challenged based on the denial of 
specific resources, any deprivation of resources that is alleged 
will have to be filtered through the lens of attorney conduct: 
how might that deprivation of resources inevitably lead to inef-
fective assistance in the future? 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, even when assert-
ed in the civil context and not necessarily subject to the con-
fines of Strickland, are also handicapped in their ability to pro-
vide prospective guidance for how counsel should perform in 
the future or what resources would be necessary to facilitate 
such conduct. As the court in Hurrell-Harring v. State—one of 
the more recent courts to adjudicate such a claim—explained:  
[E]ffective assistance is a judicial construct designed to do no more 
than protect an individual defendant’s right to a fair adjudication; it 
is not a concept capable of expansive application to remediate systemic 
deficiencies. The cases in which the concept has been explicated are in 
this connection notable for their intentional omission of any broadly 
applicable defining performance standards. Indeed, Strickland is 
clear that articulation of any standard more specific than that of ob-
jective reasonableness is neither warranted by the Sixth Amendment 
nor compatible with its objectives:  
  “More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amend-
ment refers simply to ‘counsel,’ not specifying particular requirements 
of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession’s 
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption 
that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions. The proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms . . . .”  
. . . .  
. . . While the imposition of such standards may be highly salutary, it 
is not under Strickland appropriate as an exercise in Sixth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.84
Although the Hurrell-Harring court ultimately interpreted 
the plaintiffs’ claims in that case as alleging a basic denial of 
the right to counsel under Gideon, its opinion did not bode well 
for other defendants seeking prospective relief under the Sixth 
Amendment:  
 
Inasmuch as general prescriptive relief is unavailable and indeed in-
compatible with the adjudication of claims alleging constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel, it follows that plaintiffs’ claims for 
prospective systemic relief cannot stand if their gravamen is only that 
 
compensation, which resulted in an insufficient number of available attorneys 
for indigent defendants). 
 84. 930 N.E.2d 217, 221 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
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attorneys appointed for them have not, so far, afforded them mean-
ingful and effective representation.85
Even more to the detriment of would-be claimants, other courts 
have held, similarly, that pre-conviction claims of ineffective-
ness are not cognizable at all.
 
86
II.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND INDIGENT DEFENSE   
  
From the outset, it should be clear that this Article’s sug-
gestion that indigent defense reformers should reclaim equality 
is not a suggestion that they should aim to establish wealth as 
a constitutionally suspect classification. Instead, the under-
standing of equality in which this Article is based is grounded 
in the fundamental rights branch of equal protection law87
A. A HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHT OF 
MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
 and 
the right of access to the courts that was established in Griffin. 
A description of the creation and evolution of that right follows. 
Although the Court’s more recent jurisprudence regarding 
the right to effective counsel has focused exclusively on the 
Sixth Amendment, earlier cases addressing indigents’ right to a 
meaningful defense in the criminal context were based on 
equality principles and not a lawyer’s ability to effectuate an 
effective defense. 
The first case in which the Court expressed concern about 
the effect of poverty on defendants’ ability to access to the 
 
 85. Id. at 222. Civil claimants have been more successful where they have 
alleged the denial of counsel altogether. See, e.g., Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d; 
Amended Complaint at 3–4, White v. Martz, No. CDV-2002-133 (Mont. Dist. 
Ct. Apr. 1, 2002); see also Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227 (“[T]here is con-
siderable risk that indigent defendants are, with a fair degree of regularity, 
being denied constitutionally mandated counsel . . . .”). 
 86. See, e.g., Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“[A] 
violation of a Sixth Amendment right will arise only after a defendant has 
shown he was prejudiced by an unfair trial. This prejudice is essential to a vi-
able Sixth Amendment claim and will exhibit itself only upon a showing that 
the outcome of the proceeding was unreliable. Accordingly, the claims present-
ed here are not reviewable under the Sixth Amendment as we have no pro-
ceeding and outcome from which to base our analysis.” (footnote omitted) (cita-
tion omitted)); Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1996) (holding 
Sixth Amendment claims too “speculative and hypothetical” without a showing 
of actual prejudice). 
 87. For a discussion of the distinction between suspect classifications and 
the right to equal access in the same-sex marriage context, see Nelson Tebbe 
& Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1375, 1382 (2010). 
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courts preceded Gideon by three decades: Powell v. Alabama.88 
Relying on the due process component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and not the Sixth Amendment, the Court held 
that the Constitution required the appointment of effective 
counsel in capital cases.89 Although the primary focus of Powell 
is on the Due Process Clause’s requirement of fundamental 
fairness, the opinion emphasizes the inequitable treatment of 
indigents in criminal proceedings and expresses a more general 
concern about indigents’ ability to participate in the judicial 
process.90 This more expansive view of Powell sounds in equal 
protection as well as due process principles.91
Cases following Powell and elaborating on or expanding 
the right to counsel also emphasized equal protection princi-
ples, even though the Equal Protection Clause did not formally 
constitute a basis for the opinions.
 
92 For example, in Johnson v. 
Zerbst,93 the Court adopted the reasoning of Powell’s more ex-
pansive reading and made the right to counsel available to all 
defendants in federal criminal proceedings.94 In doing so, the 
Court acknowledged the equal protection aspect of its ruling, 
stating that “the humane policy of the modern criminal law” 
requires that counsel be furnished to those defendants who 
cannot afford to employ counsel of their own.95 In the Supreme 
Court’s landmark right to counsel case, Gideon v. Wainwright,96 
the Court held that indigent defendants have a right to court-
appointed counsel in criminal cases.97 Although Gideon is rec-
ognized primarily as a Sixth Amendment case, the Gideon 
Court also recognized the influence of equal protection princi-
ples and the importance of substantive as well as procedural 
fairness.98
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and 
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safe-
guards designed to ensure fair trials before impartial tribunals in 
 Justice Hugo Black wrote for the Court: 
 
 88. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 89. Id. at 71–72.  
 90. Sundeep Kothari, And Justice for All: The Role Equal Protection and 
Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing Indigents with Meaningful 
Access to the Courts, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2159, 2163 & n.22 (1998). 
 91. Id. at 2163–64. 
 92. Id. at 2165–68. 
 93. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).  
 94. Id. at 467–68. 
 95. Id. at 463 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 96. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 97. Id. at 344. 
 98. Kothari, supra note 90, at 2168. 
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which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal 
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his 
accusers without a lawyer to assist him.99
It is clear from the opinion in Gideon that the Court was con-
cerned with the relationship between wealth and fairness: not 
only between defendants and the state, but also between de-
fendants.
 
100
In the years immediately preceding Gideon, the Court spe-
cifically addressed the importance of equality in the treatment 
of indigent defendants. In Griffin v. Illinois, in which the State 
of Illinois had conceded that a trial transcript was necessary for 
adequate appellate review, the Supreme Court held, relying on 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, that the State 
could not deprive indigent appellants of adequate review on 
appeal because of their inability to pay the cost of a tran-
script.
  
101 After Griffin, it was clear that every state was consti-
tutionally required to provide a “means of affording adequate 
and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.”102
Writing for the Court in Griffin, Justice Black found that 
the ability to pay the cost of a transcript “bears no rational re-
lationship to a defendant’s guilt or innocence and could not be 
used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”
 
103
Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of 
our entire judicial system—all people charged with crime must, so far 
 
Throughout the opinion there are references to the fact that 
those defendants with means and those without means must be 
treated as equals in the eyes of the court—for example: 
 
 99. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added); see also Simplicity as 
Equality in Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 1589–90 (“Although the deci-
sion relied formally on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . the Court 
treated equality as a component of fundamental fairness.”). 
 100. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“Governments, both state and federal, 
quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defend-
ants accused of crime . . . . [T]here are few defendants charged with crime, few 
indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present 
their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants 
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxu-
ries.”). 
 101. 351 U.S. 12, 13–14, 16, 19 (1956) (“Destitute defendants must be af-
forded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to 
buy transcripts.”). 
 102. Id. at 20. 
 103. Id. at 17–18. 
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as the law is concerned, “stand on an equality before the bar of justice 
in every American court.”104
  [O]ur own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal pro-
tection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no in-
vidious discriminations between persons and different groups of per-
sons.
 
105
  There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has.
 
106
Justice Black’s opinion relied on both due process and 
equal protection principles, but his opinion commanded a plu-
rality of only four justices.
 
107 Concurring in the judgment, Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter ensured a victory for the defendants; 
however, his opinion eschewed any reliance on the Due Process 
Clause.108 Instead, drawing on his legal realist tendencies, Jus-
tice Frankfurter’s opinion relied solely on the Equal Protection 
Clause, observing that “[l]aw addresses itself to actualities”109 
and concluding that “[t]he State is not free to produce such a 
squalid discrimination. If it has a general policy of allowing 
criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means an effective bar 
to the exercise of this opportunity.”110 In essence, Justice Frank-
furter’s position was that equal protection imposes an affirma-
tive duty upon the state to remedy any inequalities that defeat 
indigents’ ability to access the appellate process.111
In Douglas v. California, decided the same day as Gideon, 
the Supreme Court turned more explicitly to the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, holding that the government must provide indi-
gent defendants with free counsel on direct appeal.
 
112
 
 104. Id. at 17 (citation omitted). 
 In so 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 19. 
 107. Id. at 13. 
 108. Id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Thus, it is 
now settled that due process of law does not require a State to afford review of 
criminal judgments.”). 
 109. Id. at 23. 
 110. Id. at 24. 
 111. Lloyd C. Anderson, The Constitutional Right of Poor People to Appeal 
Without Payment of Fees: Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection in 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 441, 448–49 (1999). 
 112. 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). The Court has made clear that through-
out this line of cases, equal protection and due process have served two dis-
tinct roles: “‘The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing 
out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs,’ while 
‘[t]he due process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-
ordered proceedings.’” Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610–11 (2005) (quot-
ing M.LB. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996)).  
One commentator has suggested that “when a strong due process interest 
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holding, the Court relied on a clear equality rationale,113
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment where the rich man, who appeals of right, enjoys the benefit of 
counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and mar-
shalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already bur-
dened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, 
is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear 
or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, 
while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.
 invok-
ing comparison between those with means and those without:  
114
Although the Court made later attempts to limit the Griffin-
Douglas line of cases to a due process rationale,
 
115 equal protec-
tion remained a critical element of its related holdings. As re-
cently as 2005, the Court reaffirmed that this line of cases “re-
flect[s] ‘both equal protection and due process concerns’”116 but 
acknowledged also that most of its decisions in this area rely on 
equal protection principles.117
In the years following Griffin, Gideon and Douglas, the 
Court has repeatedly emphasized: (1) the idea that wealth 
should not influence defendants’ treatment by the courts; and 
(2) the notion that indigent defendants are entitled to as ade-
quate and effective review as defendants with means.
 Even when the verbalized basis 
for an opinion has been something other than equal protec-
tion—most often due process—there is a clear narrative 
throughout the access to courts’ line of cases that contemplates 
the notion of equality and its centrality to fair treatment within 
the criminal justice system. 
118
 
is present, equal protection scrutiny of wealth differentiation is triggered.” Ko-
thari, supra note 
 In 
90, at 2192. Another way of thinking about that observation 
recognizes that fundamental rights are treated differently within the equal 
protection analysis. To the extent that access to the courts is a fundamental 
right, many of these cases can be viewed as protecting equal access to the 
courts (and requiring a heightened level of scrutiny in justifying a departure 
from such equality), given the fundamental nature of that right; when the 
“right” sought by the defendant does not rise to the same fundamental level, 
the Court is not as concerned with equal treatment and instead retreats to a 
more traditional due process inquiry. 
 113. The Court in Douglas required a rationale other than the Sixth 
Amendment, on which it had relied in Gideon, because the Sixth Amendment 
applies only to trial and not the appeal. 
 114. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357–58. 
 115. See infra Part II.C. 
 116. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 610. 
 117. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 
665 (1983)).  
 118. See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963) (“In all cases 
the duty of the State is to provide the indigent as adequate and effective an 
  
2013] RECLAIMING EQUALITY 1225 
 
Entsminger v. Iowa, for example, the Court relied heavily on 
Griffin and Douglas in the case of an indigent defendant whose 
court-appointed lawyer failed to file the entire record of the de-
fendant’s trial even though it had been prepared and even 
though he had informed the defendant that he would do so.119 
Although the failure was on the part of counsel appointed by 
the state and not on the state itself, the Court held that the de-
fendant had been denied adequate and effective review.120 The 
Entsminger Court further stated: “[T]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal 
scale, and its hand extends as far to each.”121
In Mayer v. Chicago, the Court applied the logic of Griffin 
to misdemeanor appeals, holding that indigent defendants can-
not be required to pay costs in order to appeal a misdemeanor 
conviction, even when the defendant has not been sentenced to 
a term of incarceration.
 
122 In so holding, the Court again em-
phasized the need to afford defendants an “effective” appeal: 
“Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the 
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohi-
bition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an 
appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own 
way.”123 The Court’s holding in Mayer makes clear—echoing 
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Griffin—that “imposing costs 
upon indigents as a condition of appeal constitutes invidious 
discrimination, regardless of the interest at stake’s gravity.”124
In Britt v. North Carolina, the Court again reaffirmed its 
basic holding in Griffin, explaining that “Griffin v. Illinois and 
its progeny establish the principle that the State must, as a 
matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools 
 
 
appellate review as that given appellants with funds—the State must provide 
the indigent defendant with means of presenting his contentions to the appel-
late court which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant 
with similar contentions.” (emphasis added)); Eskridge v. Washington, 357 
U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (“[D]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate 
appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.” 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
 119. 386 U.S. 748, 750 (1967). 
 120. Id. at 752. 
 121. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122. 404 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1971). 
 123. Id. at 196–97 (emphasis added). 
 124. Anderson, supra note 111, at 450. Anderson points out that Mayer did 
not rely on the conclusion that a “fundamental interest” was at stake, but 
reached the same conclusion as Griffin nonetheless. Id. at 451. 
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are available for a price to other prisoners.”125
In following years—and after the close of the Warren Court 
era—the Court has continued to emphasize the principles es-
tablished in Griffin. In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Court held that, 
when a need is shown, the State must provide competent psy-
chiatric assistance to aid in “evaluation, preparation, and 
presentation of the defense.”
 In so holding, the 
Court emphasized yet again—in the context of facing criminal 
charges and the potential loss of one’s liberty—the importance 
of equal treatment of rich and poor. 
126 Although relying primarily on a 
due process rationale, Ake also invoked equal protection princi-
ples. Citing Griffin, the Court held that “justice cannot be equal 
where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied 
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial pro-
ceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”127 Recognizing that an 
indigent defendant is entitled to an adequately-resourced de-
fense team and not only access in its simplest form, the Court 
observed that “a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the 
State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making 
certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the 
building of an effective defense.”128 On the basis of that holding, 
both federal and state courts have invoked Ake to “require that 
other kinds of assistance, both expert and non-expert, are pro-
vided to indigent defendants . . . to ensure that the accused re-
ceives meaningful legal representation.”129
Elsewhere in the criminal justice context, the Court has re-
lied on equal protection principles to hold that indigents may 
not be incarcerated based on their status—or, in other words, 
for their inability to pay judicially-imposed fines.
 
130 In Bearden 
v. Georgia, for example, the Court held that revoking an indi-
gent defendant’s probation for non-willfully failing to pay a 
court-imposed fine violated both equal protection and due pro-
cess.131
 
 125. 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) (emphasis added). 
 In doing so, however, the Court also recognized that 
 126. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
 127. Id. at 76. 
 128. Id. at 77; see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 25 (explaining 
that the “principle of Griffin” was applied in Ake). 
 129. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 25 (listing federal and state cases in 
which such assistance was granted). 
 130. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 
U.S. 235 (1970). 
 131. 461 U.S. 660, 665–66 (1983). The Court found the two inquiries to be 
substantially similar in the context of the question presented. Id. (“To deter-
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“[m]ost decisions in this area have rested on an equal protec-
tion framework.”132
The cases discussed above demonstrate that equal protec-
tion has been used to guarantee a general right of access to the 
courts and also to establish certain entitlements for the indi-
gent defendant, such as a trial transcript and necessary de-
fense experts. In the last couple of decades, however, and spe-
cifically in the context of those attempting to reform struggling 
indigent defense systems, equal protection has given way to the 
dominant Sixth Amendment approach, which has limited our 
ability to understand and respond to the ways in which poor de-
fendants are uniquely harmed by systemic indigent defense 
failures. This shift is likely due to advocates’ cognizance of the 
courts’ return to a more restrictive view of equal protection and 
their refusal to recognize the poor as a suspect class.
 
133
B. GRIFFIN’S LIMITING PRINCIPLES  
 As the 
Article explains below, however, equality remains a viable ba-
sis for challenging measures that deprive defendants of access 
to justice and should not be dismissed lightly or forgotten. 
Griffin was a groundbreaking case, and not just for its role 
in securing indigent defendants’ fundamental right to adequate 
appellate review. In contrast to equal protection cases that had 
focused on outward discrimination by state actors, Griffin 
marked the first occasion on which the Court imposed “affirma-
tive obligations on government to redress inequalities not of its 
own making.”134 Michael Klarman has posited that Griffin “sig-
nificantly expanded, if not actually conceived” the fundamental 
rights strand of equal protection.135 Archibald Cox referred to 
Griffin and its progeny’s imposition of affirmative obligations 
on government to address wealth discrimination as the “most 
creative force in constitutional law.”136
 
mine whether this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause, 
one must determine whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant’s 
indigent status may be considered in the decision whether to revoke probation. 
This is substantially similar to asking directly the due process question of 
whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for the State to re-
voke probation when an indigent is unable to pay the fine.”). 
 Griffin continues to 
 132. Id. at 665; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996). 
 133. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 283–84 (1991). 
 134. Id. at 266. 
 135. Id. at 286. 
 136. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promo-
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stand for the proposition that access to the courts is a funda-
mental right, and it has remained true since Griffin was decid-
ed that discrimination in allowing access to the courts is sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.137
If we are to accept the notion that such discrimination is 
impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause, the obvious 
next question is: where does that “slippery slope” end? The cri-
tique that has been leveled against the Griffin rationale since 
its inception has been that the State can simply not be required 
to provide the poor with legal services that only the rich can af-
ford. In articulating this position in his dissent in Douglas, Jus-
tice John Marshall Harlan invoked a dramatic slippery slope 
argument, suggesting that the same rationale could easily be 
applied to other government expenses and that the government 
is not responsible for making every state-provided service 
equally accessible as a financial matter: 
 
Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis 
is more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I 
take it that no one would dispute the constitutional power of the State 
to levy a uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to 
fix rates for the purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to 
impose a standard fine for criminal violations, or to establish mini-
mum bail for various categories of offenses.138
In his dissenting opinions in both Douglas and Griffin, Justice 
Harlan emphasized that the state is not responsible for provid-
ing affirmative assistance to the indigent defendant: “Laws 
such as these do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate 
for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not 
impose on the States ‘an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps 
flowing from differences in economic circumstances.’”
 
139
The majority in Douglas responded to these critiques by 
stating that “[a]bsolute equality is not required; lines can be 
and are drawn and we often sustain them.”
  
140
 
tion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 93 (1966). 
 Although it has 
not required the state to provide equal access to every service 
that it offers—for example, state-funded higher education or 
 137. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir. 2010) (con-
trasting Griffin as a case involving a fundamental interest subject to height-
ened scrutiny). 
 138. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361–62 (1963) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). 
 139. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 
34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 140. Id. at 357 (majority opinion). 
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public utilities—the Court has concluded that certain rights, 
such as those that stand between a defendant and the wrongful 
deprivation of his liberty, fall into a different category. The line 
that the Court has chosen to draw with regard to equal protec-
tion as it applies to the poor is that which demarcates funda-
mental rights: certain rights are just too important for their 
provision or protection to turn on one’s wealth. Such line draw-
ing is not a novel legal concept and we do not always take 
rights at their most literal meaning. Indeed, without the ability 
to make distinctions or to draw lines of this type, it would be 
difficult to enforce many rights, such as the right to free speech. 
Another response to the argument that Griffin’s rationale 
would require equality in every instance is that the Griffin line 
of cases has provided its own limiting principle to the right de-
fined in Griffin. Cases like Douglas, Britt, Entsminger, and 
Mayer have made clear that poor defendants are not entitled to 
every resource imaginable; rather, they cannot be deprived of a 
tool or resource available “for a price” to other defendants only 
if that tool or resource is needed for an adequate or meaningful 
defense. At their essence, these cases presuppose that there is 
some body of resources required to gain meaningful access to 
the courts—albeit a body that may evolve over time, given 
changing legal and economic realities—and hold that an indi-
gent defendant may not be deprived of any of those resources if 
they are available to wealthier defendants. 
As to the critique that if equal protection applies, it must 
apply across the board and without limitation,141 the Equal Pro-
tection Clause has never been interpreted in such a manner. 
Instead, it has most often been used merely to guarantee access 
and not to dictate the precise contours of that access. For ex-
ample, when the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause in 
Brown v. Board of Education,142
 
 141. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); Douglas, 372 U.S. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin, 351 
U.S. at 35–36 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It is no answer to say that equal pro-
tection is not an absolute, and that in other than criminal cases the differenti-
ation is ‘reasonable.’ The resulting classification would be invidious in all cas-
es, and an invidious classification offends equal protection regardless of the 
seriousness of the consequences.”). 
 it held not that black school-
children must be treated exactly like white schoolchildren, but 
only that they were entitled to equal treatment insofar as they 
could not be excluded from white schools. As to other funda-
mental rights, such as the right to vote or the right to marry, 
 142. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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the Court has always maintained that these rights can be regu-
lated and subject to certain regulatory procedures, but that the 
right cannot be denied altogether.143
Unlike other fundamental rights—i.e., the right to privacy 
or interstate travel—the right to a meaningful defense is a 
right that is provided to indigent defendants by the state in a 
system maintained by the state and in which the state serves 
as the prosecutor; that also makes it unique and distinguisha-
ble from other rights to which individuals are independently 
entitled but which the state can merely burden (or perhaps 
more easily facilitate—i.e., by providing funding). Ironically, 
the distinction is similar to that drawn by Justice Harlan him-
self in Boddie v. Connecticut.
 In the same manner, indi-
gents may not be entitled to the best defense money can buy, 
but they cannot be excluded from the realm of meaningfulness 
that the Court envisions for a criminal trial or appeal. 
144 The criminal justice system is 
created, maintained and overseen by the state; it compels the 
participation of indigent defendants who, within that system, 
are presumed innocent and have specific constitutional and 
procedural rights to which they are entitled. States can qualify 
and add process or procedure to the satisfaction of the right—
i.e., by controlling the means by which a defendant may avail 
himself of that right, for example, by requiring that he be rep-
resented by a public defender and not the lawyer of his choos-
ing—but they may not deprive the indigent of the right alto-
gether based on an inability to pay. By failing to provide 
adequate resources to indigent defense, the state is directly 
burdening the fundamental right of access to the courts;145
 
 143. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (observing that 
“reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to 
enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed”); Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (noting that the right to vote “is not abso-
lute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate 
access to the franchise in other ways”). 
 un-
der this scenario, the state is the only entity that can remedy 
the wrong and the only way for the state to lift that burden is 
to provide adequate funding for indigent defense. That may ap-
pear to be an affirmative obligation, but that is only because 
 144. 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (observing that “[t]he requirement that these 
appellants resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created matter”); see 
also infra Part II.C. 
 145. Cf. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (“There is no meaningful distinction be-
tween a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a 
trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate re-
view accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance.”). 
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the state is in the rare position of being both the provider and 
regulator of the right as well as the opposing party in the con-
text of the litigation (who may benefit from the deprivation of 
the right). The benefit being made available by the state is not 
just the provision of counsel, but meaningful access to the judi-
cial process; because certain tools are needed to navigate that 
process, it would be wrong for the Court to allow the state to 
deny the poor that benefit merely because of their inability to 
afford such tools, particularly when it is the state itself who 
would benefit from such a denial. 
Another compelling justification for treating this right as 
different from others and affording it additional protection is 
the fact that so much is at stake. Many other rights—including 
even other fundamental rights—do not potentially implicate 
the absolute loss of liberty or, in some cases, life.146 This context 
is thus clearly distinguishable from others in which the Court 
has been unwilling to extend equal treatment to the poor.147
One last note: although Griffin’s holding may seem far-
reaching, its approach is actually far more limited than some of 
the alternatives that could be advanced to protect the rights of 
the poor in this context, such as providing heightened scrutiny 
to all wealth classifications discriminating against the poor.
 
Here, when the failure to protect the right at issue may result 
in the incarceration or even execution of an innocent person—it 
is critical that equal treatment be applied to prevent the poor 
from being at risk.  
148 
Moreover, the fundamental rights approach advanced by cases 
like Griffin only implicates certain state action, and not all 
state action that has a disparate economic effect.149
 
 146. See discussion infra note 
 
172 (presenting Kenji Yoshino’s thesis that 
liberty has become a central theme of protected rights). 
 147. See infra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (rejecting explicit-
ly heightened scrutiny for poverty discrimination). 
 149. Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Econom-
ic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 342 (1999). The fundamental rights 
approach is limited by the fact that “only that state action which burdens cer-
tain defined economic equality rights merits heightened scrutiny, leaving the 
government free to institute programs beneficial to the economically disadvan-
taged in other areas [without being subjected to the same level of scrutiny].” 
Id; see also supra text accompanying notes 141–49.  
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C. EQUAL PROTECTION’S LIMITATIONS LEAVE GRIFFIN’S 
HOLDING INTACT 
In the decades since Griffin was decided, the Court has 
limited the scope of equal protection in several ways.150
First, since Griffin, the Court has limited the application of 
heightened scrutiny to only “fundamental” rights or interests.
 Howev-
er, none of those developments have diminished indigent de-
fendants’ ability to marshal equal protection principles in sup-
porting their claim to a meaningful defense. 
151 
Under the Warren Court, the strand of equal protection that 
aimed to eliminate disparate wealth effects resulting from state 
action, and which encompassed cases like Griffin and Douglas, 
flourished.152 Perhaps it was inevitable that with a change in 
Court personnel would come an increasing apprehension about 
an exception that might swallow the rule, and a wariness of the 
slippery slope that might be initiated if the court were to 
acknowledge the poor as a suspect class warranting heightened 
protection.153 As one commentator has observed: “The virtually 
limitless reach of a constitutional rule condemning disparate 
wealth effects pressured the Court to restrict its wealth dis-
crimination rationale to ‘fundamental’ rights, which . . . Grif-
fin . . . clearly involved.”154 Although there has been hesitation 
on the Court’s part to expand the “fundamental right” in Grif-
fin to other stages of the criminal appeal or to the civil con-
text,155 or to add new rights to this category,156
 
 150. One commentator recently observed that in the past several decades, 
the Court has limited its equal protection jurisprudence in “at least three 
ways—it has limited the number of formally protected classifications, it has 
curtailed its solicitude for classes within already protected classifications, and 
it has restricted Congress’s power to enact antidiscrimination legislation.” 
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755 (2011).  
 it has not signifi-
 151. See Klarman, supra note 133, at 266. 
 152. Id. at 265–68. 
 153. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (label-
ing the fundamental rights category “an exception which threatens to swallow 
the standard equal protection rule”). 
 154. Klarman, supra note 133, at 266. 
 155. In the wake of Griffin, the Court not only refused to extend Griffin’s 
equal protection analysis to other contexts; it also refused to extend such an 
analysis to further stages of the criminal appeal. After guaranteeing that indi-
gent defendants would have the assistance of court-appointed counsel at both 
the trial and appellate stages, the Court subsequently refused to extend the 
right to counsel into post-conviction. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 
1, 10 (1989) (finding no right to appointed counsel in federal post-conviction, 
even for capital cases); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987) (find-
ing no right to the appointment of counsel in post-conviction appeals post-
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cantly curtailed or eliminated the right established in Griffin 
itself. 
Second, the Court has made clear that it will not as a gen-
eral matter, recognize poverty as a suspect classification de-
serving heightened scrutiny.157 In Griffin and also in Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections—both decided during the heyday of 
the Warren Court—the Court seemed to suggest that it would 
apply heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against the 
poor.158
 
direct appeal); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974) (holding there is no 
right to appointed counsel in discretionary appellate proceedings). In so decid-
ing, the Court privileged federalism concerns over the same strong liberty in-
terest that was given credence in Gideon and Douglas. In Ross v. Moffitt, the 
Court explained that “[t]he duty of the State under our cases is not to dupli-
cate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant 
in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent 
defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context 
of the State’s appellate process.” 417 U.S. at 616. The Court also refused to ex-
tend Griffin’s rationale to create a per se right to counsel in civil cases. See 
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25–27 (1981) (drawing a distinc-
tion between criminal cases, where a loss of personal liberty is at stake, and 
civil cases, in which there are not the same concerns). 
 In later years, however, the Court held that only ra-
tional basis review would be applied to classifications based on 
wealth. In Dandridge v. Williams and San Antonio School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, the Court held that it would not second guess 
state decisions regarding the allocation of limited public 
 156. The Court has been fairly stingy in its willingness to expand the “fun-
damental rights” view of equal protection to other spheres—i.e., welfare, hous-
ing and education funding. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 54–55 (1973) (educational funding); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 
(1972) (housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (welfare); 
see also Jeffrey, supra note 149, at 262 (noting that the Court has declined to 
recognize as fundamental rights the right to welfare benefits, housing, federal 
employment, funded education and pregnancy-related medical care); Klarman, 
supra note 133, at 267 (noting that the Court has declined to apply the same 
equal protection analysis to the contexts of food, housing and medical care). 
Some have argued that those rights are not as fundamental as the right to 
counsel, which has always been strictly protected. Yale Kamisar, Has the 
Court Left the Attorney General Behind?–The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on 
Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 KY. L.J. 464, 
468–69 (1966). In any event, in cases like Dandridge and Rodriguez, it became 
apparent that after the Warren Court era, the “door to discovery of new fun-
damental rights was firmly shut.” Klarman, supra note 133, at 287. 
 157. See Jeffrey, supra note 149, at 291–92 (“[W]hile the Supreme Court 
had at times indicated that wealth is a suspect classification meriting height-
ened scrutiny, it is now relatively well established that such classifications are 
not suspect.”). 
 158. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (“Lines drawn 
on the basis of wealth and property, like those of race, are traditionally disfa-
vored.”). 
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funds159 and that discrimination against the poor did not war-
rant heightened scrutiny.160 In Rodriguez, however, the Court 
specifically identified Griffin as an exception to the general rule 
that wealth classifications will be treated under rational basis 
review, treating indigency (in the context of Griffin and defined 
as the inability to pay) as a classification warranting height-
ened scrutiny.161 Therefore, although the Court has made clear 
that it will not generally recognize the poor as a protected class 
for purposes of equal protection analysis,162
 
 159. Dandridge, 387 U.S. at 487. 
 it seems to have 
carved out and maintained a special exception for indigency, at 
 160. Id. at 485; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55. In Lindsey v. Normet, the Court 
reaffirmed its new stance, stating that the “Constitution does not provide judi-
cial remedies for every social and economic ill.” Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74. A few 
years later, in Maher v. Roe, the Court unequivocally stated that it “has never 
held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis.” 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977). 
 161. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20–22; see also id. at 61 & n.6 (Stewart, J., con-
curring). In Rodriguez, the Court’s two threshold objections to applying strict 
scrutiny were that (1) the plaintiffs were suffering a relative and not absolute 
deprivation and (2) the class of disadvantaged poor was not easily defined. See 
id. at 19. In the indigent defense context, the affected class is easily defined as 
“indigent,” as the term is used in practice; these individuals have already been 
deemed unable to pay for a defense. As for the question whether the “rela-
tive—rather than absolute—nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant 
consequence,” id., Griffin sets a bar whereby the deprivation of any element 
critical to a meaningful defense or appeal—such as a trial transcript—
constitutes a sufficient deprivation for purposes of equal protection analysis. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1955). In Rodriguez itself, the Court dis-
tinguished Griffin, holding that the individuals affected in that case were in 
the category of those “completely unable to pay for some desired benefit” and 
who “sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy 
that benefit.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20. Another distinction not highlighted by 
the Rodriguez Court—not surprisingly, as Rodriguez was decided more than a 
decade before Strickland—is that cases like Strickland and McMann have 
rendered the denial of effective counsel and the absolute deprivation of counsel 
both constitutionally significant violations demanding redress. See Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that the “right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel” (quoting McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 162. The Burger Court rejected the idea of using the Equal Protection 
Clause as a means to ensure equal entitlements to government benefits, leav-
ing it primarily as a means for prohibiting intentional discrimination by the 
state. See Klarman, supra note 133, at 289–90 (“[T]he Justices were more com-
fortable forbidding state regulation of certain spheres [i.e., abortion] than re-
quiring government equalization (or at least ‘minimum protection’) of funda-
mental interests such as education, food, shelter, and medical care. The 
unpalatable aspect of fundamental rights equal protection, in other words, was 
not its recognition of enumerated rights, but its reconceptualization of equal 
protection as an entitlement to affirmative governmental assistance.”). 
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least in the context of poor criminal defendants attempting to 
ensure that they are entitled to a meaningful defense. 
In the years following Griffin, and as part of its desire to 
lessen the scope of equal protection’s reach, the Court has also 
made efforts to recharacterize Griffin and the cases that fol-
lowed in its wake as relying solely on due process and not equal 
protection.163 Justice Harlan dissented vigorously from the 
Court’s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause in Griffin, con-
tending that Griffin’s ruling was based solely in procedural due 
process principles. In Boddie v. Connecticut, Justice Harlan 
vindicated his point of view, writing for the Court to invalidate 
divorce court filing fees as applied to indigent persons solely on 
due process grounds.164 To reconcile the Court’s decision in 
Boddie with that in Griffin, Justice Harlan characterized both 
Boddie and Griffin as implicating elements of state coercion 
and monopolization; because only the courts can grant divorce 
and because those accused of crimes are forced into the court 
system, indigent individuals in both contexts are compelled to 
participate in the judicial process.165 In the years that followed, 
the Court continued to move away from any expansion of equal 
protection analysis and more often utilized a due process anal-
ysis that would allow states to differentiate based on wealth.166
 
 163. Klarman, supra note 
 
133, at 287 (“[The Burger Court] 
reconceptualized Griffin and progeny as due process cases.”). 
 164. 401 U.S. 371, 382–83. 
 165. See id. at 376–77; see also Klarman, supra note 133, at 267. The rest 
of the Burger Court did not find this rationale compelling. In United States v. 
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444–46 (1973), the Court refused to apply the state mo-
nopolization/coercion rationale in the context of bankruptcy filing fees. Justice 
Douglas’s conference notes reveal that many of the Justices questioned 
Boddie’s validity and wished to keep it extremely restricted in its application 
or scope. See Klarman, supra note 133, at 287. 
 166. In several cases limiting the expansion of the right to trial and appel-
late counsel, the Court resurrected the due process rationale that had been 
utilized in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), much to the detriment of criminal defend-
ants. In cases like Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (no per se 
right to counsel in probation or parole proceedings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (right to counsel applies in cases of actual imprison-
ment but not in cases where there is a threat of imprisonment); and Scott v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (no right to counsel where imprisonment up-
on conviction is authorized but not imposed), the Court applied a more tradi-
tional Sixth Amendment/due process analysis and found that the infringement 
on liberty—the loss of conditional liberty, the threat of imprisonment (as op-
posed to actual imprisonment), or the imposition of a fine—was not sufficient 
to trigger heightened scrutiny or to override federalism concerns and declined 
to require the appointment of counsel. See Kothari, supra note 90, at 2182; see 
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The emphasis on equal protection, however, resurfaced in 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.167 In M.L.B., the 
Court held that the state could not require parents to pay a fee 
for preparation of the trial record in order to appeal a custody 
termination.168 In her opinion for the Court, Justice Ginsburg 
stressed the nature of the fundamental rights involved—here, 
choices about one’s family and marital life.169 She also empha-
sized that the right of access to the courts invoked “both equal 
protection and due process concerns.”170 In so holding, M.L.B. 
extended Griffin’s intertwined equal protection and due process 
analysis into the civil arena and resurrected equal protection 
principles as they related to access to the courts.171 M.L.B. also 
reemphasized the idea that where strong due process concerns 
are present, an element of equal protection must be present as 
well.172
 
also, e.g., Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (“Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, 
whereas any extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but 
necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States.”). Similarly, in Las-
siter v. Department of Social Services, which involved the right to counsel in 
parental rights termination proceedings, the Court “employed a deferential 
due process analysis that found neither a per se right nor a due process right 
to counsel.” Kothari, supra note 
 And, according to at least one commentator, the Court 
90, at 2184. 
 167. See 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996). 
 168. Id. at 107. 
 169. Id. at 116 (“Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of 
children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic im-
portance in our society.’” (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 
(1971))). 
 170. Id. at 104. 
 171. See Kothari, supra note 90, at 2194–97, 2200–01; see also M.L.B., 519 
U.S. at 133 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority’s opinion 
“not only adopts the equal protection theory of Griffin v. Illinois . . . but ex-
tends it”). 
 172. Kothari, supra note 90, at 2195 (“The Court asserted that the presence 
of a strong liberty interest mandated heightened scrutiny that emphasized 
both equal protection and due process principles.”). 
Kenji Yoshino has recently put forth a different analysis of the apparent 
trend away from explicit reliance on equal protection and towards due process; 
his thesis that the Court is moving away from pure group-based equality 
claims to “liberty-based dignity claims,” see Yoshino, supra note 150, at 150, 
aligns with the idea that the rights acknowledged in Griffin and Douglas are 
still vital and prime for renewal. Yoshino describes liberty-based dignity 
claims as “hybrid equality/liberty claims” and explains that his use of the term 
“dignity” is meant to encapsulate the two and acknowledge “what academic 
commentary has long apprehended—that constitutional equality and liberty 
claims are often intertwined.” Id. at 749.  
Like many of the examples discussed in Yoshino’s article, the right central 
to the Griffin-Douglas line of cases is inherently tied to the protection of liber-
ty. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (“Thus to deny adequate 
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actually “gave greater emphasis to the equal protection feature” 
of its analysis.173
In addition to imposing the above boundaries on the reach 
of equal protection, the Court has limited its broader applica-
tion by requiring a showing of intent. In Washington v. Davis,
  
174 
the Court held that state action would not be held unconstitu-
tional merely because it results in a disproportionate impact 
among members of different groups.175 Instead, the Court held 
that facially neutral government conduct producing disparate 
impacts will be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause only 
if illicitly motivated.176 Davis is emblematic of what Michael 
Klarman has described as the “understanding of equal protec-
tion rights as checks upon deliberate governmental disad-
vantaging rather than entitlements to particular substantive 
outcomes.”177
 
review to the poor means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or 
property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts would set 
aside.”). In fact, Yoshino ties the upsurge in liberty-based dignity claims to the 
doctrinal antecedent of the “rights” strand of equal protection jurisprudence, 
which includes the right of access to the courts. See Yoshino, supra note 
 
150, 
at 790; see also id. at 790–91 (noting that in deciding cases like Douglas, the 
Court “vindicated the rights of the poor even when it was ultimately unwilling 
to take the more far-reaching step of granting heightened scrutiny to wealth-
based classifications”). Under Yoshino’s theory, fundamental rights that give 
the appearance of being based in due process—i.e., the liberty-based dignity 
claim, which is his new equal protection paradigm—have the advantage of 
seeming to apply universally, so they avoid the issue of defining wealth as a 
constitutionally protected status. See id. at 793. 
 173. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive 
Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1198 n.95 (2000). In contrast, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence relied solely on the Due Process Clause and the dis-
senters argued against any extension of Boddie or Griffin. Id. 
 174. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 175. Id. at 239, 242 (“[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and 
serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater pro-
portion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, 
but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden 
by the Constitution.”). 
 176. Id. at 239–41; see also Yoshino, supra note 150, at 764 (stating that a 
disparate impact violates the Equal Protection Clause only if the disparate 
impact “operate[d] as at least a partial incentive for the state action”). This 
runs counter to dicta in several Warren Court decisions suggesting that legis-
lative motivation may be irrelevant in determining whether facially neutral 
legislation producing disparate impacts violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
Klarman, supra note 133, at 295. 
 177. Klarman, supra note 133, at 217. The Warren Court had been evolv-
ing its jurisprudence towards “reconceptualizing equal protection rights as en-
titlements to particular outcomes.” Id. at 291. The advent of the Burger Court, 
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Yet the requirement to demonstrate intent has never posed 
an obstacle when striking down barriers to indigent defendants’ 
access to the courts.178
[A]s we said in Griffin v. Illinois, “a law nondiscriminatory on its face 
may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.” Here the Illinois stat-
ute[] as applied to Williams works an invidious discrimination solely 
because he is unable to pay the fine. On its face the statute extends to 
all defendants an apparently equal opportunity for limiting confine-
ment to the statutory maximum simply by satisfying a money judg-
ment. In fact, this is an illusory choice for Williams or any indigent 
who, by definition, is without funds. Since only a convicted person 
with access to funds can avoid the increased imprisonment, the Illi-
nois statute in operative effect exposes only indigents to the risk of 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum. By making the maxi-
mum confinement contingent upon one’s ability to pay, the State has 
visited different consequences on two categories of persons since the 
result is to make incarceration in excess of the statutory maximum 
applicable only to those without the requisite resources to satisfy the 
money portion of the judgment.
 This is in large part because the Court 
has defined the harm resulting from these barriers is not mere 
disproportionate impact, but rather the cabining of a distinct 
group to which equal application is denied by definition. In Wil-
liams v. Illinois, the Court held that  
179
This interpretation of equal protection as applied to access to 
the courts remains unchanged several decades later—even af-
ter the Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis. In M.L.B., Jus-
tice Thomas dissented from the Court’s opinion, arguing that 
Davis foreclosed any equal protection relief for the petitioner as 
the filing fee requirements at issue were facially neutral and 
the petitioner had not demonstrated any intent to discrimi-
nate.
 
180
 
however, brought a seeming end to the establishment of new fundamental 
rights and a return to a more traditional understanding of equal protection 
rights, which required deliberate discrimination against or disadvantaging of 
a particular group. Id. at 291–92. 
 The M.L.B. majority rejected this view, holding that the 
instant case could be distinguished from Davis because the fil-
ing fee provisions at issue were “not merely disproportionate in 
impact. Rather, they are wholly contingent on one’s ability to 
pay, and thus ‘visi[t] different consequences on two categories 
of persons’; they apply to all indigents and do not reach anyone 
 178. For a more explicit argument for a fundamental rights “exception” to 
Davis’s intent requirement, see Brad Snyder, Note, Disparate Impact on Death 
Row: M.L.B. and the Indigent’s Right to Counsel at Capital State 
Postconviction Proceedings, 107 YALE L.J. 2211 (1998). 
 179. 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970) (footnote omitted) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
 180. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135–39 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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outside that class.”181 The same rationale applies to any finan-
cial barrier posed to obstruct indigents from obtaining equal 
access to the courts—or, as the M.L.B. Court described, any 
“procedures which [deny] an indigent [a] meaningful [defense 
or] appeal.”182 Moreover, it should be noted that because the 
right recognized in Griffin is a fundamental right,183 the state 
must meet a heightened burden in order to restrict the applica-
tion of that right to any group of persons.184
A public defense system to which only indigent defendants 
are subject and which fails to provide necessary elements for a 
defense satisfies the same measure as described in Williams 
and M.L.B.: the State has constructed and underfunded a sys-
tem in which the poor—i.e., those defined as legally indi-
gent
 
185—face a barrier to access and a fair trial; overcoming 
that barrier is contingent on one’s ability to opt out of the sys-
tem and retain private counsel.186 Enacting a filing fee that cuts 
off access by shutting certain people out,187 applying a punish-
ment only to those who cannot pay a fine188
 
 181. Id. at 127 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).  
 and constructing a 
deficient system that, by definition, bars certain individuals 
 182. Id. at 127 n.16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Six of the seven 
Justices in the majority in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), had two 
Terms before Davis read our decisions in Griffin and related cases to hold that 
[t]he State cannot adopt procedures which leave an indigent defendant entire-
ly cut off from any appeal at all, by virtue of his indigency, or extend to such 
indigent defendants merely a meaningless ritual while others in better eco-
nomic circumstances have a meaningful appeal.” (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 
U.S. 600, 612 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 183. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (recognizing “the 
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts”). 
 184. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir. 2010) (high-
lighting Griffin as concerning a fundamental interest subject to heightened 
scrutiny). 
 185. For a discussion of standards for determining eligibility for legal assis-
tance, see PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 40, Standard 5-7.1, at 
87–90. 
 186. In his dissent, Justice Thomas recognized that Williams’s rationale 
survived Davis. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 137 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He reconciled 
the cases under the theory that the law did not merely have a disproportionate 
impact, but rather applied to all and only indigents. Id. The dilemma faced by 
indigent defendants is clearly analogous to Williams and the same rationale 
would apply: by definition, the harms worked by dysfunctional indigent de-
fense systems are applicable to all and only those defendants who cannot af-
ford to hire their own counsel. Justice Thomas also expressed a desire in that 
same dissent to overrule Griffin and its progeny. Id. at 139. However, his is 
clearly a minority view. 
 187. Id. at 106 (majority opinion). 
 188. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970). 
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from access to a meaningful defense, are barriers of differing 
types, but they all have the same effect: visiting different con-
sequences on two different categories of persons, based solely 
on their inability to pay.189
III.  WHY EQUAL PROTECTION?   
 
Although the Court has, in many ways, attempted to rede-
fine, reframe and restrict the application of equal protection, 
the fundamental right established by the Griffin-Douglas line 
of cases has survived and equal protection still applies to that 
right with the same force: no defendant may be denied the right 
to a meaningful defense based solely on what he or she can af-
ford.190 Collectively, the cases described above could be read to 
support a far more robust principle that poor defendants cannot 
be subjected to a different criminal justice system—one that is 
severely resource-deprived—or treated differently (in certain 
respects) because of their inability to fund their own defense. It 
is true that the resources need not be equivalent in every re-
spect—but the playing field has to be leveled to the extent that 
both groups have access to all of the critical “tools” of a de-
fense.191
In this context, the injury suffered by the poor is not only 
the deprivation of resources vis-à-vis a wealthier class, but a 
deprivation which, by definition, denies them access to a fair 
 
 
 189. If anything, the relevant class in the latter scenario is more clearly 
defined, given the specific guidelines for indigency. See PROVIDING DEFENSE 
SERVICES, supra note 40, Standard 5-7.1, at 87–90. 
 190. Lower courts still apply the same equal protection framework set forth 
in Griffin and Douglas to claims regarding access to the courts and wealth-
based discrimination in the criminal context. See, e.g., Miller v. Smith, 115 
F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that Griffin has been applied “be-
yond the transcript and fee context to cases involving the adequacy of an indi-
gent’s access to the appellate system” and that Griffin and its progeny are 
based in equal protection as well as due process); State v. Adams, 91 So.3d 
724, 741 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (“The statutory scheme at issue here produces 
the same type of discrimination condemned by the United States Supreme 
Court in Griffin and its progeny—discrimination resulting in deprivation of a 
fundamental right that is based, in actuality, on poverty.”). To allow jurisdic-
tions some leeway in fulfilling the right, however, they have allowed for alter-
native means of reaching the same end. For example, a state can require an 
indigent to apply for representation by the public defender’s office as a prereq-
uisite to providing him a transcript free of charge. Miller, 115 F.3d at 1141. 
 191. See, e.g., Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) (noting that 
equal protection requires the State to provide indigents “with the basic tools of 
an adequate defense or appeal”). 
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adversarial proceeding.192
Given its availability, applying an equal protection ap-
proach to the problem at hand would have several distinct ben-
efits in the context of indigent defense reform. Some of those 
benefits are inherent to equal protection doctrine—particularly 
as it is distinguished from Sixth Amendment doctrine. Other 
benefits—and arguably the more significant, if also more ab-
stract—are the conceptual benefits gained not only by courts 
but also by reform movements and the evolution of public per-
ception as a result of applying equality principles to the indi-
gent defense context. 
 In that sense, the equal protection in-
jury is a gateway injury, barring access to resources that are 
necessary to pursue justice on equal terms. In contrast, the 
Sixth Amendment injury, once a lawyer has been provided in 
some form, is defined by what happens once the defendant is 
already in pursuit of justice, ignoring any relevant yet funda-
mental differences that occurred prior to initiating the pursuit. 
Imagine that all of the soldiers being sent into war were issued 
guns, but for those who were poor the gun was immediately ex-
changed for a knife. It makes little sense to focus on what oc-
curs once on the field or on what any given soldier is able to ac-
complish with the knife. The question is not whether each 
soldier is capable of killing or whether the soldier would have 
died regardless of the weapon brandished (under the Sixth 
Amendment) but whether there was some more fundamental 
violation that immediately deprived the poor soldiers of a 
fighting chance at the outset. The injury is not death, but the 
selective deprivation of a gun. 
A. DOCTRINAL ADVANTAGES OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION 
APPROACH 
Before delving into the doctrinal advantages of an equal 
protection approach, a note of acknowledgment about the limi-
tations of such an argument is necessary. Some courts will be 
hostile to this new use of the doctrine, just as they have been 
hostile to Sixth Amendment claims and other equal protection 
claims,193
 
 192. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (noting that such a 
deprivation would “make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a worthless 
thing”). 
 but willing courts could use equal protection to create 
 193. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 133, at 291–304 (discussing the Burger 
Court’s stricter, less-expansive interpretation of equal protection as compared 
to the Warren Court). 
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a more robust model for access to justice, one that keeps the 
equality principles in the Griffin-Douglas line of cases alive.194
1. Systemic Recognition vs. Individual Vindication 
 
This would have ramifications not only for indigent defendants 
in the present day, but also for the future evolution of access to 
the courts, under conditions that we cannot predict or antici-
pate today. 
One clear difference between the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment approaches is that the Sixth Amendment focuses 
on the protection of an individual right while equal protection 
focuses on differential treatment among groups. In the indigent 
defense context, the Sixth Amendment can at best recognize 
that there is a need for a more robust right to counsel and then 
hope that right will be applied consistently across the board.195 
The Sixth Amendment and the Strickland analysis in particu-
lar do not make any distinction between different types or clas-
ses of defendants; the test is a neutral, objective test that ap-
plies to all defendants, whether they are indigent or not and 
whether their counsel is appointed or retained.196
An equal protection approach, in contrast, recognizes that 
a certain class of individuals
 
197
 
 194. This is especially true in considering that many cases involving indi-
gent defense reform play out on the state level, where courts may have more 
latitude, given that they can rely on their own state constitutional provisions 
regarding equal protection as well as the federal constitutional guarantee. See, 
e.g., Eric Wolf, The Theory and Application of Equal Protection: Developments 
in the Right to Counsel, 5 WM. MITCHELL J. L. & PRAC. 1 (2012), available at 
http://lawandpractice.wordpress.com/2012/01/17/the-theory-and-application-of 
-equal-protection-developments-in-the-right-to-counsel/ (discussing the Minne-
sota Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morris v. State, extending the right to 
counsel to misdemeanor defendants seeking a first review by postconviction 
proceeding based on the Minnesota Constitution’s equal protection provision). 
—poor criminal defendants—is 
 195. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“The 
Sixth Amendment refers simply to ‘counsel,’ not specifying particular re-
quirements of effective assistance.”). 
 196. See supra note 44. 
 197. Jeremy M. Miller, The Potential for an Equal Protection Revolution, 25 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 287, 298 (2006) (“[A]lthough [the] Equal Protection Clause 
and Due Process Clause analyses similarly seek to preserve the rights of indi-
viduals, equal protection focuses on the characteristics of the group that is dis-
criminated against, while due process focuses on the characteristic of the indi-
vidual right that is allegedly individually infringed.”); cf. The Supreme Court, 
1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 86, 93 (1983) (discussing the criminal sentencing 
of indigents and stating, “[b]y focusing on the state’s treatment of the individ-
ual defendant [under a due process approach], the Court can avoid assessing 
the relative impact a fine has on classes of indigent and nonindigent defend-
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being systemically deprived of the right to a meaningful de-
fense.198
Whether we view the problem of access to justice as one re-
quiring only individual rights vindication or one requiring 
recognition of much broader and deeply ingrained social and 
economic inequity matters not only because of how that choice 
will influence the direction of evolving doctrine but also be-
cause of the nature of the remedies that will be applied to elim-
inate the harm and how directly they address the source of the 
problem.
 Rather than thinking about whether or not a lawyer 
can do her job effectively under certain resource constraints—a 
paradigm in which exceptionally talented lawyers may anecdo-
tally harm defendants making such a claim—an equal protec-
tion approach shifts attention away from what any individual 
lawyer or group of lawyers may be able to make of a certain 
fact scenario and redirects it to the need to remedy differential 
treatment of the poor. One benefit of this approach may be that 
it is more palatable to lawyers. The shift from an individual to 
a structural focus shifts the blame from individual lawyers and 
prevents them from having to “fall on their sword” or admit in-
effectiveness (which some proud lawyers may be hesitant to do) 
to obtain relief. More important, however, framing the problem 
in this way encourages solutions that are specifically aimed at 
raising the level of resources available to indigents—to ensure 
that they are not being deprived of the initial access to a fair 
playing field—and not solutions that attempt to hone the objec-
tive analysis applied to both rich and poor defendants. 
199
 
ants.”). 
 Individual right to counsel cases—even those that 
 198. See AM. BAR ASS’N & NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, GIDEON 
UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 3 (John Thomas Moran 
ed., 1983) (focusing, in part, on the inequalities that result when indigent de-
fendants are forced to rely on underfunded systems of representation); cf. 
Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting 
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 57–58 
(1969) (discussing the relationship between “minimum protection”—i.e., pro-
tection against severe deprivation—and equal protection, concluding that the 
two are intertwined, that the differences between the two are “practically in-
consequential” and that equal protection can provide a justiciable framework 
for the duty of minimum protection, which is more difficult to enforce); id. at 
45 (noting that “a court’s inability to enforce minimum protection duties di-
rectly [by, for example, dictating legislative conduct] . . . does not mean that 
minimum-protection thinking might not contribute to the issuance of a more 
regular judicial remedy”). 
 199. For elaboration on the argument that guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot be realized in a society characterized by class subordina-
tion and that law should therefore aim to reform institutions and practices 
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are fairly egregious—can easily be isolated and painted as 
anomalies not necessitating broader systemic relief. Even if 
there is recognition that a stronger right to counsel is needed, 
there is no acknowledgment within that analysis of how it may 
apply to different groups or how intervening circumstances 
such as wealth may affect access. The Sixth Amendment reme-
dy does not alter anything about the system structurally; it 
merely addresses process issues by allowing the defendant an-
other bite at the apple. It is concerned about outcome,200
In contrast, the equal protection approach is focused direct-
ly on the underlying question of resources, which will inevita-
bly transform not only a defendant’s second bite at the apple, 
but also the bites of other poor defendants. To remedy the une-
venness of the stances from which the two groups begin, re-
sources must be recalibrated so that other rights—such as the 
right to counsel, which does not become wholly inapplicable—
can be applied with equal force in various contexts. Under this 
paradigm, those without resources are not accidental benefi-
ciaries of broader rights enforcement or of a case-by-case litiga-
tion strategy built on individual right to counsel claims, but ra-
ther the direct beneficiaries from recognition of their 
disadvantaged status. Even if a “trickle-down” Sixth Amend-
ment approach would slowly chip away at the problem of access 
by mandating the enforcement of individual aspects of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that approach is not as di-
rect in its application and lacks the same capacity for broader, 
deeper structural change. 
 but in 
providing a remedy, does nothing affirmative to ensure a dif-
ferent outcome or process the second time around. 
2. Equal Resources vs. “Effective” Lawyering 
Another benefit of the equal protection approach is that it 
takes a more holistic view of access to justice and can therefore 
better address factors beyond the lawyer appointed to represent 
an indigent defendant, including issues of funding. 
There is an important distinction to be made between the 
Sixth Amendment and equal protection frameworks when 
thinking about how to evaluate the availability of specific re-
 
that enforce a social caste system, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). 
 200. See id. at 694 (”The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.”). 
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sources in the indigent defense context. Under a Sixth Amend-
ment analysis, a deficiency must be identified and then the de-
fendant must prove that the absence of the resource or tool at 
issue will lead to actual or likely ineffective assistance.201
The two approaches appear to overlap conceptually where 
a tool required for a meaningful defense is the same tool needed 
by a lawyer to do his or her job effectively. Resources that are 
not tied directly to a lawyer’s abilities or action taken by a law-
yer in a given case—such as compensation or caseloads—
however, will fit comfortably within the equal protection 
framework whereas they cannot be addressed easily under the 
Sixth Amendment. Similarly, equal protection can better ad-
dress structural elements such as funding over which the state, 
but not the attorney, has control, whereas the Sixth Amend-
ment’s effectiveness may be limited to those matters within the 
attorney’s control, such as when and how much to investigate a 
case. Furthermore, thinking about whether something is (or 
was, post hoc) necessary for attorney “effectiveness,” given the 
way in which that term has been defined by Sixth Amendment 
case law,
 So, 
any question of resources will have to be filtered through the 
attorney standing between the defendant and those needed re-
sources. This additional level of analysis allows a variety of in-
termediary factors—e.g., the attorney’s decisions about case 
strategy and the attorney’s individual capabilities—to affect 
the ultimate question of whether a rights violation has oc-
curred. In the equal protection context, however, the resource 
question does not have to be filtered through the attorney me-
dium. Instead, an equal protection analysis can go directly to 
the question of resources, asking whether indigent defendants 
have access to the same resources as defendants with means.  
202
 
 201. See id. at 687. 
 is different from asking under the ex ante equal 
protection paradigm what is needed to meaningfully contest a 
criminal charge and whether those resources are being made 
available regardless of a defendant’s wealth. The comparative 
element that is introduced in the equal protection context—
asking whether an indigent defendant is on equal footing with 
his wealthier counterparts or whether a resource is available 
and would unquestionably be employed by those with means—
adds a helpful angle to the inquiry.  
 202. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–96 (1984) (dis-
cussing how a defendant must establish that he or she was provided ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel). 
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The transcript at issue in Griffin203 is a paradigmatic ex-
ample of something that would fall into this category. Like the 
transcript in Griffin, other aspects of pre-trial preparation are 
essential and yet today are routinely unavailable to defendants 
subject to underfunded defense systems.204 Any lawyer repre-
senting an indigent criminal defendant needs resources—either 
in the form of an investigator or adequate time to conduct the 
investigation him or herself—to investigate the facts of the 
crime (and mitigation, in capital cases) and to investigate and 
interview potential prosecution witnesses.205 The latter is par-
ticularly important given the critical role of cross-examination 
in undermining the case against the defendant. Similarly, if the 
state intends to introduce certain forensic evidence, the defense 
needs its own forensic experts to provide for true adversarial 
testing of such evidence.206 If one is a defendant with means, 
these are basic “tools” one would employ—they provide the 
foundation for investigation and cross-examination, two of the 
most fundamental aspects of defense representation.207
 
 203. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13–16 (1956). 
  
 204. See JUST. POL’Y INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-
RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011) (discussing the overwhelmed and under-
funded public defense system). 
 205. When the office responsible for representing capital defendants across 
the state has attorneys and investigators carrying caseloads of twelve to twen-
ty-five capital cases at a time, those defendants could hardly be said to have 
the resources necessary for a meaningful defense, yet the availability of an in-
vestigator or the amount of time an attorney has available to work on any one 
case (given his or her overall caseload) is not likely to bear on the analysis of 
an individual attorney’s effectiveness under the current analysis. See, e.g., 
Kyle Martin, Caseloads, Funding Main Reasons for Death Penalty Case De-
lays, Say Capital Defenders, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 27, 2012, available at 
http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/crime-courts/2012-07-27/caseloads-funding-
main-reasons-death-penalty-case-delays-say-capital (observing that in Ken-
tucky, the “state’s capital defenders, investigators and mitigation specialists 
are . . . carrying caseloads ranging from 12 to 25 capital cases at any given 
time” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 206. Although Ake provides for expert resources in the mental health con-
text and has been more expansively interpreted by some lower courts, it has 
often been interpreted more narrowly and its implementation has “fall[en] far 
short of what is needed.” See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to 
Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1305, 1311, 1311–12 n.36 (2004).  
 207. See, e.g., 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (1923) (“For two centuries past, the 
policy of the Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to regard the neces-
sity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law . . . . [I]t is be-
yond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth.”); James Carey, Charles Laughton, Marlene Dietrich and the Prior In-
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Equal protection analysis can expand to include newly 
available technologies and techniques that are independent of 
lawyering ability but still related to the meaningfulness of an 
overall defense. For example, as new DNA-based technology is 
made available, but is not as easily accessible to indigent de-
fendants represented by a public defender, Griffin could guar-
antee the provision of such a technology or category of technol-
ogy, given its increasing centrality to proving innocence 
claims.208 There are limits, of course: although a wealthy de-
fendant might also employ jury consultants, there is no sugges-
tion here that an indigent defendant must have access to every 
tool that might be useful or provide an advantage to the de-
fense—only those that are held to be critical to a defense or 
without which the adversarial process is undermined.209
Other claims based on disparities in resources or capacity 
but which are only indirectly related to lawyering—such as 
caseloads and training—are more complicated, but may also be 
better suited to equal protection analysis. Take the problem of 
excessive caseloads, an issue that Sixth Amendment litigation 
has not effectively addressed.
 
210
 
consistent Statement, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 433, 441 (2005) (“Cross-examination 
is the single most important feature of this adversarial system, and impeach-
ment with a prior statement is the quintessence of cross-examination.”); Jules 
Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, 
and “At Risk,” 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 427 (2009) (“Cross-examination is re-
garded as the sine qua non of the American trial system.”).  
 In some public defender offices, 
Regarding the importance of investigation, see Jenny Roberts, Too Little, 
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretri-
al Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1097, 1099 (2004) 
(“Investigation of the prosecution’s case and possible defenses has long been 
recognized as a core function of defense counsel in a criminal case, one that is 
necessary to the testing of the facts in our adversarial system.”); Rodney J. 
Uphoff, The Physical Evidence Dilemma: Does ABA Standard 4-4.6 Offer Ap-
propriate Guidance?, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1177, 1213–14 (2011) (“Thus, it is not 
so much the danger of defense lawyers rushing to the crime scene to disturb 
evidence that threatens the integrity of the criminal justice system, but a fail-
ure of many defense lawyers to do an adequate, timely investigation that un-
dermines the functioning of the adversarial system.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 206, at 1313–16 (discussing the rising 
importance of DNA evidence and the need for expert assistance in interpreting 
such evidence). 
 209. This category is not so limited as to be meaningless—it could still en-
capsulate a wide variety of tools, and certainly more than what is required to-
day. The limiting principle ensures, however, that the measure for that to 
which indigents are entitled is not anything that a rich defendant could afford. 
 210. See Laurence A. Benner, Eliminating Excessive Public Defender Work-
loads, 26 CRIM. JUST. 24, 25 (Summer 2011) (explaining how reliance on post-
conviction Sixth Amendment claims has failed to adequately address the prob-
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lawyers handle more than 1,000 cases per year; far beyond 
what national standards recommend.211 For example, as recent-
ly as 2004, public defenders in New York were “handl[ing] 
1,000, 1,200, 1,600 cases” per year,212 whereas national stand-
ards suggest a maximum caseload per year of 150 felonies, 400 
misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or 
25 appeals.213 Yet there is no Sixth Amendment right to a law-
yer with a manageable caseload or adequate training.214 As one 
commentator has explained, in the Sixth Amendment context, 
high caseloads demonstrate the probability of harm but do not 
themselves constitute injury.215
In contrast, equal protection concerns may be invoked 
when structural harms such as excessive caseloads exist only in 
the context of public defender systems because, like the tran-
script in Griffin, the provision of a lawyer with a reasonable 
amount of time to spend on one’s case is a gateway factor to 
equal access.
 
216 Moreover, the distinction between the two is of-
ten not a matter of slight degree—public defenders often have 
caseloads that would far exceed any reasonable standard and 
more than any responsible attorney would take on in private 
practice.217
 
lem of excessive caseloads); see also Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. 
Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads 
Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 277 (2011) (noting that 
legal challenges brought by indigent defendants based on excessive workloads 
“have mostly been unsuccessful”). 
 Under an equal protection analysis, the court could 
decide that access to a lawyer with adequate time to work on a 
case (meaning the absence of excessive caseloads) is a threshold 
factor placing the indigent and non-indigent on unequal footing 
at the outset and that a meaningful defense requires a lawyer 
 211. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUS-
TICE 17 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_ 
counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 212. Id. 
 213. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS AND 
GOALS: COURTS 276–77 (1973) (promulgating Standard 13.12) [hereinafter 
COURTS]. 
 214. Chiang, supra note 81, at 474. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970) (where only indigents 
are at risk of certain deprivations, the State has “visited different consequenc-
es on two categories of persons,” violating equal protection).  
 217. Cf. supra note 3. 
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who is logistically able to spend more than a few hours on any 
given case. 
Under a Sixth Amendment approach, a fact-based inquiry 
into the likelihood that an excessive caseload would result in 
ineffective assistance would necessarily be employed, opening 
up the door to other variables, such as lawyering capability and 
the inherent subjectivity in determining how varying caseloads 
affect different lawyers, which may affect the ultimate analysis. 
To complicate the analysis, Strickland’s reliance on “prevailing 
professional norms”218 could do such claimants a disservice if 
the standard for indigent representation is low (and therefore 
achievable under a crushing caseload), as it is today. And, un-
der Strickland, the vindication of the right may ultimately be 
trumped by the fact that, for example, a defendant’s guilt has 
been so clearly established that no lawyer—even one with a 
much more reasonable caseload—could have achieved a differ-
ent result.219
For similar reasons, equal protection is a much more apt 
doctrinal tool for addressing the issue of underfunding, which 
arguably poses the largest obstacle to indigent defense reform. 
As explained in Part I, the Sixth Amendment approach is not 
well-designed to account for issues of funding.
 
220
The deficient performance prong of the Strickland analysis 
asks whether counsel’s conduct was reasonable under prevail-
ing professional standards;
 
221 it is not designed to govern the 
provision of external resources to counsel. Even if a court were 
to somehow factor into its consideration the fact that counsel’s 
performance was deficient due to a lack of resources, the preju-
dice inquiry would have the force to render that finding a nulli-
ty, because the defendant claiming ineffective assistance would 
have to prove that his or her case was prejudiced by counsel’s 
deficient conduct;222
 
 218. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 if the defendant were unable to do so, any 
consideration of underfunding at Strickland’s first prong would 
be irrelevant to the ultimate holding. And, by its nature, the 
Sixth Amendment has nothing to say about those resources 
 219. Id. at 695 (“When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”). 
 220. See supra Part I.A. 
 221. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. 
 222. See id. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.”). 
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which do not directly affect attorney conduct. In addition to be-
ing poorly designed to incorporate the ways in which funding 
affects the provision of legal representation in pending cases, 
the Strickland test is not designed to provide guidance as to 
how much funding or which resources would be necessary in fu-
ture cases to guarantee effective assistance of counsel.223
What about prospective Sixth Amendment claims made in 
the civil context? In such cases, a defendant could argue that 
systemic underfunding created a situation in which any lawyer 
subject to that system would be likely to provide ineffective as-
sistance. Although claimants seeking injunctive relief are in a 
better position to make the funding argument than appellants 
making post-conviction Strickland claims, they are still limited 
by the fact that they must demonstrate a link between inade-
quate funding and the likelihood of ineffectiveness.
 
224 This is 
not only a fact-specific claim that may be difficult to prove,225
A funding argument in the equal protection context would 
focus not on the likelihood that a structural deficiency—such as 
funding—may lead to ineffective assistance of counsel, but ra-
ther on whether indigent defendants are denied access to tools 
that wealthier defendants can obtain “for a price.” Funding dis-
parities are facially discriminatory, as the Court recognized in 
cases like Williams and M.L.B., because they visit “different 
 
but it also requires a lot of assumptions about how one factor 
will affect attorney conduct across the board and in many dif-
ferent kinds of cases; it therefore seeks a conclusion that may 
be difficult to draw with any definitiveness. 
 
 223. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Allen, Free for All a Free for All: The Supreme 
Court’s Abdication of Duty in Failing to Establish Standards for Indigent De-
fense, 27 LAW & INEQ. 365, 379 (2009) (noting that Gideon and Strickland pro-
vide “no guidance for states on the minimum standards and funding that the 
Court would find appropriate to achieve the ends that the decisions mandate”). 
 224. See, e.g., Quitman Cnty. v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032, 1048 (Miss. 2005) 
(“Quitman County did not [meet] its burden of proving that the funding mech-
anism established by statute led to systemic ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.”); cf. id. at 1048–49 (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting that the trial court was 
misguided in taking a case-by-case approach rather than looking at how the 
system as a whole adversely affected attorney conduct). 
 225. See, e.g., id. at 1037–48 (majority opinion) (upholding the trial court’s 
decision that the county had not “met its burden” in part because the county 
had not produced “specific examples of when the public defenders’ legal repre-
sentation fell below the objective standard of professional reasonableness”); 
State v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 831 (Kan. 1987) (requiring “specific evidence in 
the record . . . of deficient performance” in order to find an indigent defense 
system unconstitutional). 
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consequences on two categories of persons.”226 And in this con-
text, funding disparities have meant not that the government 
provides funding to one group and not another, but instead that 
it makes some benefit—or a certain kind of access—available 
for a price, or deprives those unable to pay.227 The equal protec-
tion lesson gleaned from cases like Griffin, Williams and 
M.L.B. is that the indigent cannot, by virtue of the tools they 
have (or do not have) at hand, be effectively barred from the 
justice system to which the rich have access.228
The obvious next question is: which tools—and, therefore, 
what level of resources—are necessary? (The fact that such a 
question remains does not change the validity of the initial les-
son, regardless of the answer.) Defining all of the parameters 
and the precise content of what would or could be protected un-
der an equal protection approach—aside from the illustrative 
suggestions made above regarding the availability of investiga-
tive and expert resources, access to forensic technology, and 
maintenance of reasonable caseloads—is beyond the scope of 
this Article. The analysis as to which “basic tools” fall within its 
protection is a normative one but would not be a wholly ab-
stract endeavor; such an analysis would be grounded in factual 
 Because the 
equal protection approach is focused directly on the question of 
resources, it has greater potential to generate judicial man-
dates requiring the expenditure of funds to satisfy stated re-
source requirements and to force other branches of government 
to respond in ways that directly address identified resource in-
equalities—i.e., by appropriating the necessary funds or initiat-
ing broader systemic reforms that make such appropriations 
unnecessary (e.g., reclassification of crimes or alternative sen-
tencing). 
 
 226. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 
519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996) (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 242). 
 227. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983) (explaining that the 
equal protection analysis focuses on “whether the State has invidiously denied 
one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of de-
fendants”). 
 228. There are of course limitations on the extent to which a Court can ac-
tually order funding to be appropriated, see infra note 278, and this Article 
does not take on all concerns regarding the ultimate implementation of reme-
dies under the Sixth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. This is an 
ever present problem in the discussion about how courts can improve indigent 
defense systems—given that the devil often lies in the dollars—but since that 
dilemma is applicable to any discussion of reform, it is at most a neutral issue 
and does not alone counsel for or against a Sixth Amendment or equal protec-
tion approach. 
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evidence presented to the court (such evidence would likely in-
clude expert testimony on the necessity of certain elements to 
the defense).229 The ultimate limiting principle to the court’s 
analysis—as expressed in Griffin and its progeny—would be 
that the tool at issue must be deemed critical to a meaningful 
defense.230 The equal protection approach at least gives willing 
courts latitude to engage in the substantive inquiry of what a 
defendant would need to satisfy that standard, whether it re-
lates directly to a lawyer’s performance or not. In contrast, the 
body of Strickland precedent that has been developed in the 
last several decades presents a much higher barrier to courts 
that wish to contribute to reform and to specify what is re-
quired to meet the same end.231
What might an order from a court granting relief in the 
form of resources critical to a “meaningful defense” look like? 
Although drawn from a completely different context, the order 
issued by the Federal District Court for the Middle District of 
Alabama in Pugh v. Locke might serve as an example.
 
232
 
 229. It is not impossible to conceive of a court reaching the conclusion that 
the deprivation of a particular resource violates a defendant’s equal protection 
rights. Less than a decade after Griffin, but years before Ake v. Oklahoma was 
decided, the Fourth Circuit held in Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th 
Cir. 1965), that, as a matter of equal protection, a defendant was entitled to 
the appointment of a psychiatrist at the government’s expense. Id. at 573; see 
also Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[In Jacobs,] we 
recognized that the obligation of the government to provide an indigent de-
fendant with the assistance of an expert was firmly based on the equal protec-
tion clause.”). Citing Griffin, Gideon, and Douglas, the Jacobs court explained: 
 Having 
found that the living conditions in Alabama prisons violated 
the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual 
  Unquestionably in the proceedings below the defendant, if finan-
cially able, would have had the right to call a privately retained psy-
chiatrist as a witness. It is obvious that only his inability to pay for 
the services of a psychiatrist prevented a proper presentation of his 
case. The Supreme Court has unmistakably held that in criminal pro-
ceedings it will not tolerate discrimination between indigents and 
those who possess the means to protect their rights.  
Jacobs, 350 F.2d at 573. 
As a limiting principle, courts may require a threshold showing of need before 
providing a defendant with any given resource. See, e.g., Williams, 618 F.2d at 
1026 (“The determination of the defendant’s need for expert assistance is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.”); see also supra note 185 
(describing eligibility requirements for legal assistance). 
 230. See, e.g., Jacobs, 350 F.2d at 573 (finding that a psychiatrist is a criti-
cal tool to a defense). 
 231. See supra Part I. 
 232. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam).  
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punishment, the district court in Pugh “promulgated a detailed 
set of Minimum Constitutional Standards for Inmates of Ala-
bama Penal System and ordered the defendants to report to the 
court in 6 months concerning their programs in the implemen-
tation of each and every standard.”233 These standards covered 
a wide range of substantive areas, including prison population, 
cell size, conditions of isolation, sanitation and hygiene, nutri-
tion, and staffing.234
3. Prospectively Defining a Meaningful Defense 
 If a court were to find, based on the evi-
dence before it, systemic equal protection violations depriving 
indigent defendants of a meaningful defense, one could envision 
a similar issuance of “minimum constitutional standards for 
indigent defense,” perhaps including standards for minimum 
compensation, maximum workload, and the availability of in-
vestigative and expert resources. 
As discussed above, the Sixth Amendment presents an ob-
stacle to the promulgation of specific guidelines or require-
ments for “effective” lawyering, given Strickland’s focus on as-
sessing only the retrospective reasonableness of counsel’s 
performance.235 Moreover, under the Sixth Amendment, an in-
digent defendant is entitled only to an effective attorney and 
not necessarily to an adequate defense, which may include re-
sources beyond the attorney him or herself. To the extent some 
have viewed civil class actions as a way to reach beyond indi-
vidual attorney conduct, some courts have explicitly stated that 
Strickland claims cannot be addressed prospectively.236
 
 233. Ira P. Robbins & Michael B. Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Con-
finement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State 
Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 
896–97 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Instead, 
some courts will only address such claims in post-conviction, 
which raises a host of problems for those seeking reform—
 234. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case 
Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 605–08 (2006) 
(describing the Pugh order, including its substantive coverage and its incorpo-
ration by reference of other detailed standards, including those drafted by oth-
er government authorities and academics). 
 235. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984) (discussing 
the retrospective reasonableness approach). 
 236. See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333–34 
(M.D. Ala. 2005) (finding that an ineffective assistance claim raised prior to or 
during a defendant’s criminal trial is premature); Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 
357, 363–64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (declaring a pre-trial ineffectiveness claim 
unripe because the defendant had not yet been to trial and therefore had no 
record on which to litigate his claim). 
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including the need to show prejudice—and have held that effec-
tiveness is “not a concept capable of expansive application to 
remediate systemic deficiencies” but instead only to protect an 
individual’s right to a fair adjudication.237
Under an equal protection approach, in contrast, the 
“meaningful defense” standard all but invites courts to affirma-
tively state the elements of such a defense—or, at the very 
least, creates a welcome opportunity for them to do so. Also im-
portant is that while the Sixth Amendment approach holds de-
fense counsel accountable under more objective “prevailing pro-
fessional norms”—norms which themselves may have 
developed in an economically anemic context—equal protection 
more comfortably allows courts to challenge or define the norm, 
taking a more active approach towards establishing what a 
meaningful defense should and must entail. Once that norm is 
established, equal protection also carves a clearer path towards 
leveling up those who have not reached that norm and, if nec-
essary, providing those defendants with specific entitlements. 
 
Courts attempting to tackle this inquiry need not reinvent 
the wheel or start from scratch. There is plenty of guidance on 
the issue of what resources or systemic requirements should 
underlie any functional public defense system. Many organiza-
tions, including the ABA, the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association (NLADA), and special commissions, such as the 
President’s National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals, have released professional guidelines for 
the provision of indigent defense.238 These standards provide 
guidance on a variety of matters, including counsel’s specific 
responsibilities at different stages of the case and necessary 
contact with the client,239 the timing of appointments and con-
ditions for meeting with the client,240 defense counsel’s broader 
duties (including sufficient time, resources, knowledge and ex-
perience to work on his or her assigned cases),241
 
 237. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 221 (N.Y. 2010). 
 the workload 
 238. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993); COURTS, supra note 213; 
NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMI-
NAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1995); PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra 
note 40; TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 40. 
 239. COURTS, supra note 213, at 259–60. 
 240. Id. at 270. 
 241. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
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and compensation of individual public defenders,242 and sup-
porting personnel and facilities.243
Courts need not prescribe highly specific or numerical 
rules, but they can certainly declare what is before them un-
reasonable, provide general guidance as to the elements re-
quired for a meaningful defense, and force actors on the ground 
to come up with workable, jurisdiction-specific solutions.
  
244 
Moreover, this guidance could bleed over to affect the quality of 
lawyering itself, broadening equal protection’s potential impact 
and reaching aspects of attorney representation not typically 
accessed as part of the Sixth Amendment analysis. For exam-
ple, a court could—perhaps by deeming the lawyer herself a 
necessary “tool” to the provision of a meaningful defense (and 
therefore that the poor must have equal access to that tool)—
require that a lawyer maintain a reasonable caseload of ap-
pointed cases (and restricted private caseload, in the case of an 
attorney who is not a full-time public defender) such that he or 
she has adequate time to devote to investigating and preparing 
for each case.245 In other words, the court could declare that if 
both rich and poor have the right to an attorney, but the indi-
gent defendant has access to that attorney for only minutes just 
before entering a plea, the poor are being denied equal access to 
a full attorney by the state. National standards for maximum 
caseloads—150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 
200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals per year246—could be 
provided as a guideline for what might be reasonable, much as 
the ABA Guidelines regarding the importance of investigation 
in capital cases were used to support the Court’s holding that a 
reasonable investigation be conducted in every capital case.247
There may be, under an approach focused on equality, a 
concern that equal protection does not specify the level at 
which such equalization should occur. Generally, under equal 
protection analysis, “inequality may be remedied either by lev-
eling up and improving the treatment of the disadvantaged 
 
 
 242. COURTS, supra note 213, at 253–75. 
 243. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
 244. See, e.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025–26 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(finding that funds must be provided to supply the defendant with a 
pathologist for him to have an effective defense). 
 245. See TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
 246. COURTS, supra note 213, at 276–77. 
 247. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (quoting Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984)) (relying on ABA standards 
as “guides to determining what [attorney conduct] is reasonable”). 
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class, or by leveling down and bringing the group that is better 
off down to the level of those worse off.”248 Because the choice to 
“level down” would satisfy an equal protection claim to the 
same degree as “leveling up,” some commentators have warned 
of the danger that equal protection claims may actually leave 
those seeking equality worse off.249 The equal protection claim 
at issue in Griffin, however, avoids this dilemma: there is no 
ability for the state to level down because it cannot control the 
resources that well-off defendants bring to bear in providing 
their own access to the courts.250
4. A More Direct Path to Normative Judgments 
 Because the state must ensure 
that all defendants have an equally meaningful opportunity to 
assert a meaningful defense at trial or to contest their convic-
tion on appeal, it can respond only by providing the poor—when 
required under Griffin’s limiting principles—the resources 
available to those with means. 
As instruments of reform, both Sixth Amendment and 
equal protection approaches will involve some element of nor-
mative assessment as to whether a certain resource, tool, or 
structural feature is necessary to vindicate the right at issue. 
There is an important difference, however, between the two 
analyses as to when and how that decision is made. 
Under a Sixth Amendment approach, the inquiry demand-
ing of a normative assessment lies in the causal finding linking 
deficiency and ineffective attorney conduct.251 In the equal pro-
tection context, the initial inquiry is merely whether the re-
source is available only to those who can afford it.252
 
 248. Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The 
Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 
(2004). 
 Assuming 
an affirmative answer—which will be the case by definition 
when we are talking about a defendant who has been classified 
 249. See, e.g., id. at 515–16. 
 250. Compare Yoshino, supra note 150, at 787 (arguing that, as a general 
matter, an equality norm allows the state to level down while a liberty-based 
(due process) approach will lead to less leveling down), with The Supreme 
Court, 1982 Term, supra note 197, at 90–94 (arguing that Bearden’s “‘funda-
mental fairness’ standard allows the Court greater freedom to choose exactly 
how much protection it will extend to the poor than does a rule of equal treat-
ment for rich and poor” and that Bearden’s focus on “‘fundamental fairness’ 
rather than equal treatment allows the Court to limit that protection in the 
future”). 
 251. See supra Part I. 
 252. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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as indigent in the criminal context—a normative assessment 
must be made as to whether the same tool is critical to a mean-
ingful defense. 
It is true that equal protection offers a more open-ended 
inquiry and requires a more normative judgment on the part of 
the courts (which, for some tribunals, may be a lot to ask).253 
But, for those courts willing to embrace and make substantive 
policy judgments, they will have one less hurdle to overcome—a 
hurdle that under the Sixth Amendment requires fact-intensive 
exploration of the link between funding and ineffectiveness. As 
a result, equal protection provides a more direct path to the 
point at which courts must make a normative decision about 
what level of funding is necessary to ensure an adequate de-
fense and what tools are indispensable in any criminal case. 
The need to filter factors through the attorney medium is elim-
inated and the external factors that could cloud the effect of re-
source deprivation through that process are avoided. In some 
ways, the normative judgment also requires less speculation—
courts are not expected to suggest how the deprivation of a re-
source will affect a wide range of attorneys in a variety of dif-
ferent contexts. And to the extent Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence has been unfriendly to defendants seeking relief because 
of their perceived status as “criminals,” the shift in focus to pro-
tecting the poor might be more palatable (as a relative matter). 
These choices are certainly tough ones to make, and courts’ 
avoidance of such choices may happen in any context, but this 
Article posits that they are necessary for courts to maintain a 
relevant role in indigent defense reform.254
 
 253. See Bibas, supra note 
 For courts that are 
68, at 10 (noting that while judges are capable 
of “promot[ing] effective assistance of counsel via systemic reform, they are 
reluctant to flex their muscles” and hesitant to make policy judgments). 
 254. Any wariness of requiring equal treatment of rich and poor in the con-
text of criminal defense likely shares common roots with what William Stuntz 
describes as the hesitance of courts to make substantive, as opposed to proce-
dural, legal rules: when making such judgments—particularly about the allo-
cation of resources—there is “no nonarbitrary way to arrive at the proper legal 
rules, no way to get to sensible bottom lines by something that looks and feels 
like legal analysis.” Stuntz, supra note 26, at 73. Stuntz posited that the “only 
way to set [substantive criminal law and funding standards—such as sentenc-
ing guidelines and] funding floors is to set them.” Id. Similarly, the only way 
for courts to effectively apply an equal protection analysis to the indigent de-
fense context will be for them to define the specific tools which indigent de-
fendants are being denied and which are required to satisfy the constitutional 
requirements of a meaningful defense. While defining the contours of criminal 
procedure—the Sixth Amendment analysis—may feel like a safer and more 
acceptable route, creating substantive constitutional parameters may be, as 
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willing to do so,255
Another advantage of the equal protection approach is that 
once a resource is established as critical to a meaningful de-
fense under a Griffin-type analysis, that substantive rule can 
more easily be consistently applied to future cases, creating the 
benefit of predictability.
 the equal protection approach provides a 
more direct path. 
256 If courts hold that indigent defend-
ants are entitled as a matter of equal protection to specific tools 
that ensure a meaningful defense, the extent to which the in-
quiry is subjective can be minimized in the future.257
The availability of specific “basic tools” necessary to a 
meaningful defense or appeal is more easily discerned and gen-
eralized to an entire class than the amorphous concept of effec-
tive representation. And once an entitlement is defined as a 
“tool,” it is less vulnerable to subjective analysis. It may be 
hard to gauge what level of assistance will be necessary in any 
given criminal case to provide meaningful representation, but 
surely experts can agree on a subset of tools and conditions 
(i.e., full compensation, necessary support services and a rea-
sonable workload) necessary for counsel to provide adequate 
assistance as a general matter; indeed, many already have.
 
258
 
Stuntz suggests, a more powerful way to “address serious and common injus-
tices.” Id. at 71. 
 
 255. See, e.g., Simmons v. State Pub. Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 86 (Iowa 
2010) (“While it is true that an adverse ruling will have some fiscal impact on 
the state, this is true in many situations. If the court was constrained any 
time a ruling had fiscal impact, Gideon itself, which has been characterized as 
an ‘enormous unfunded mandate imposed upon the states,’ would have been 
wrongly decided.” (citation omitted)). Cf. Mayer v. City of Chi., 404 U.S. 189, 
201 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“An affluent society ought not be miserly 
in support of justice, for economy is not an objective of the system.”). 
 256. See, e.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1980) (fol-
lowing the Jacobs court in requiring, upon an adequate demonstration of need, 
that an indigent defendant be provided with the assistance of an expert as a 
matter of equal protection). 
 257. See Miller, supra note 197, at 302 (“[A] critical legal benefit to using 
equal protection, as opposed to due process, is predictability . . . . Once the 
classification [of a distinguished group] and the analysis [i.e., level of scrutiny] 
have been determined, a similarly situated group can better predict the out-
come of equal protection challenges in the future.”); see also The Supreme 
Court, 1982 Term, supra note 197, at 90 (“Insistence on equality establishes 
the state’s treatment of nonindigent defendants as a standard by which to 
measure its treatment of indigents; insistence simply on fairness, however, 
allows the Court to make its own determinations of what is fair in various con-
texts.”); id. at 92 (contrasting an equality approach with “ad hoc determina-
tions of fairness”). 
 258. See, e.g., PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 40, at 1–42 
(providing, inter alia, for reasonable and prompt compensation, training and 
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For example, courts might conclude that a lawyer handle no 
more than a set number of cases per year259 or that states pro-
vide one hundred percent of indigent defense funding (as op-
posed to a mix of state and local funding).260
B. CONCEPTUAL ADVANTAGES OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION 
APPROACH 
 In contrast, and as 
discussed above, the Sixth Amendment approach is a more fact-
dependent inquiry and not intended or designed to create sub-
stantive entitlements or set specific requirements for attorney 
conduct that can easily be applied to future cases. 
Conceiving of indigent defense reform as a matter of equal 
protection rather than a pure right to counsel issue has some 
doctrinal advantages, as discussed above. But perhaps the 
greater value lies in the conceptual benefits and potential socie-
tal value gained by thinking about the issue as one of equality. 
Doing so highlights the disparities present in the current indi-
gent defense system and the fact that harm that is being done 
to an entire class of people without access to a meaningful de-
fense. Once we acknowledge that the right to counsel does not 
protect everyone equally, we can more clearly define who is be-
ing harmed by gross underfunding of public defense and be 
more direct about how that discrepancy in harm must be reme-
died. It also helps reformers to focus on a broad-based attack at 
 
professional development, maintenance of reasonable caseloads, and the pro-
vision of investigatory, expert, and other services necessary to quality legal 
representation); ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 40, at 939–88 (providing, inter 
alia, for specific staff members to be included in the defense team, such as an 
investigator and a mitigation specialist; reasonable workloads; funds for train-
ing, professional development and continuing education; and full compensa-
tion, commensurate with prevailing rates for similar services). Some have at-
tempted to adopt these guidelines as measurements of adequate performance 
in the Sixth Amendment context; but, in many cases, they have not been suc-
cessful. See, e.g., supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 259. See, e.g., COURTS, supra note 213, at 276–77 (setting a standard for 
maximum caseloads per year of 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile, 
200 mental health, and 25 appeals); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, su-
pra note 40, at 424 (stating that caseloads should “reflect national standards 
and guidelines”). 
 260. One major issue of indigent defense funding has been that in many 
states, states only partially fund indigent defense for the states (even though 
providing indigent defense is and should be a state function). This has led to 
disparate and underfunding in many states, including Georgia, where counties 
are not required and often fail to fill the resulting funding gap. JUSTICE DE-
NIED, supra note 2, at 53–57. 
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the roots of the underlying problem, rather than incrementally 
chipping away from the top down. 
Some critics claim that equality is a superfluous proposi-
tion aside from the substantive right ultimately sought to be 
enforced. For example, Peter Westen has argued that equality 
is merely “a ‘form’ for stating moral and legal propositions 
whose substance originates elsewhere, a ‘form’ of discourse 
with no substantive content of its own.”261 Westen further con-
tends that “the remedies entailed by equality are identical to 
the substantive remedies that would exist in its absence”262 and 
that “equality cannot produce substantive results unattainable 
under other forms of analysis.”263 Similarly, another commenta-
tor suggests that in the criminal context, equality is not appro-
priately used as a prescriptive ideal, but instead only “as a di-
rective to follow the substantive standard” of how people should 
be treated.264
In the context of indigent defense reform, equality is not as 
meaningless as these commentators would suggest, particular-
ly in light of courts’ demonstrated failures to use the Sixth 
Amendment to further delineate substantive standards for 
what indigent legal representation should be. Equality in this 
context serves an important purpose, which is not only to en-
force the right in a different way—i.e., with a specific focus on 
those elements that are made available to wealthy defendants 
but not to poor defendants—but also to fill in the gaps between 
the specific substantive rights carved out by the courts under 
the Sixth Amendment. Assume the basic proposition that un-
derfunding of indigent defense systems affects not just the bi-
nary question of whether someone has a lawyer, or even 
whether that lawyer is constitutionally effective, but the entire-
ty of a defendant’s experience within the criminal justice pro-
cess—from the time that passes before he is appointed a law-
yer, to the amount of time he spends with the lawyer and the 
amount of time available to the lawyer to spend on his case, to 
the caseloads of the lawyers who are appointed to indigents, to 
the resources available to those lawyers to undertake adequate 
 
 
 261. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 577–
78 (1982). 
 262. Id. at 593. 
 263. Id. at 579. 
 264. Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 359, 363 (2001). 
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investigations, employ necessary experts and the like, and so 
on. Under the Sixth Amendment, one would have to carve out 
individual duties or responsibilities of counsel at every point 
along the way. At best, this would result in incrementally chip-
ping away at the problem, one aspect of counsel’s deficient per-
formance at a time, without recognizing or directly addressing 
the underlying causes of such performance. It is only once myr-
iad individual aspects of the right have been established—i.e., 
the right to lawyer with a reasonable caseload, the right to an 
investigator, etc.—that the bigger picture and the pervasive in-
equality that belies the under-enforcement of these individual 
rights would be revealed. 
In contrast, an equal protection approach would start at 
the other end of the equation, recognizing at the outset that the 
problem is one of equal access based on wealth disparities and 
that the differential in access necessarily leads to disparate 
representation. Once the root of the problem is recognized, the 
necessary elements to remedy that inequity flow from that 
foundation. For example, once it has been held that indigent 
defendants require equal access to a meaningful defense, we 
can direct our attention to the aspects of indigent defense rep-
resentation most affected by wealth disparities—i.e., over-
whelmed attorneys without the necessary time to devote to 
each case and a dearth of critical investigative and expert re-
sources—and address those as a priority. In doing so, many as-
pects of any individual attorney’s performance would inevitably 
be affected and improved. Another way of thinking about the 
problem is that the faults of an underfunded system manifest 
themselves through the lawyer’s conduct: the Sixth Amend-
ment targets the outcomes or end results of unequal access by 
focusing on the lawyer’s performance while equal protection 
delves earlier into the process, attacking the causes of unequal 
access. 
If each approach reached its natural end, would the result 
be the same? In some respects, yes—certain aspects of indigent 
defense representation could theoretically be addressed 
through either avenue. The background aspects not as clearly 
tied to specific attorney conduct, however, would more likely be 
recognized only through an equal protection approach, which 
can encompass the broader experience of a group of defendants 
while the Sixth Amendment remains focused on the procedural 
mechanics of representation. Moreover, there is the reality that 
the Sixth Amendment has a fixed interpretation in the indigent 
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defense context, given years of reliance and resulting prece-
dent. While the likelihood of success of an equal protection ap-
proach may be unclear, it is more likely than a reversal of en-
trenched Sixth Amendment law. 
By taking a broader view of the problem and focusing on its 
root causes, the equal protection approach also has the power 
to ultimately expand the rights of the affected class beyond the 
substantive contours of the Sixth Amendment. For example, 
although Douglas v. California is on its face a decision about 
the right to a lawyer on appeal, that right could not be ground-
ed in the Sixth Amendment and could only be expanded in this 
way by turning to equal protection and the recognition that 
“there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a 
man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he has.’”265
The questions we ask ourselves about the problems we 
see—who is being harmed, why and how—and the answers 
that follow have the potential to alter the trajectory of the indi-
gent defense reform movement.
 One 
can think of other aspects of representation—such as excessive 
caseloads—that do not fit easily into the Sixth Amendment 
paradigm, but do fit more naturally into the idea of a two-tiered 
justice system that makes certain things—like a lawyer with 
adequate time to devote to a case—available only to those who 
can pay the price.  
266 If we do not acknowledge 
that the quality of defense representation provided by the state 
is not merely a subset of the more broadly applicable right to 
counsel but instead a poor people’s problem, how can we expect 
our solutions to do anything other than perpetuate, or at least 
not address, the particular ways in which rights enforcement 
bypasses the poor? Beyond any purely legal benefit that the no-
tion of equality may offer, framing access to justice as an equal 
protection issue has the capacity to influence not only the de-
velopment of the law and the way in which courts reach their 
conclusions, but also inform the way we, as a polity, under-
stand the rights involved and structure our societal values.267
 
 265. 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (citation omitted). 
 
 266. The exploration of how the legal approach taken to reform indigent 
defense could influence not only the trajectory of reform itself, but also socie-
ty’s views on the issue of indigent defense and of those affected by indigent de-
fense failures, could well serve as the topic for an entirely separate paper. I 
merely raise the issue here to demonstrate the power of equality in this con-
text. 
 267. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Framing Change: Cause Lawyering, Constitu-
tional Decisions and Social Change, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 263, 294–95 (2010) (de-
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Another way to think about the difference between the two ap-
proaches is to recast the landmark case of Brown v. Board of 
Education268
A culture that values only individual rights is not neces-
sarily concerned about public welfare and is more prone to the 
notion that all citizens are capable of equal success, provided 
that they have the will. A society that values equality in addi-
tion to individual rights is more likely to recognize when those 
rights are not being or cannot be enforced equally and will take 
additional steps to ensure that all citizens have access to the 
same opportunities. 
 as a substantive rights case: what if Brown had 
been a case about whether African-Americans are entitled to 
the substantive right to a quality education or a diverse stu-
dent body? Of course Brown cannot be wholly removed from its 
historical or political context, but no one would dispute that the 
understanding of equality stemming from that case has been 
one of the most influential messaging mechanisms in the rela-
tionship between law and society. 
  CONCLUSION   
Questions of equality, society and justice are massive and 
cannot be taken lightly. Therefore, this Article does not purport 
to address everything that may fall within those concepts or 
fully resolve detailed questions of implementation. Instead, the 
Article makes a plea to not abandon the principle of equality as 
meaningless or as superfluous—particularly in the context of 
indigent defense, where poor defendants have few other protec-
tions against the loss of their freedom. It aims here to provide a 
broader picture of how we would incorporate equality back into 
indigent defense reform and the benefits that such reincorpora-
tion would yield. 
In spite of judicial efforts to scale back equal protection and 
to lessen its influence, the fundamental right of access to the 
courts still receives special treatment under equal protection 
analysis. Griffin and its progeny have required and continue to 
require that, as a matter of equal protection, the basic tools 
necessary for a meaningful defense must be provided to indi-
gents “when those tools are available for a price” to other de-
fendants.269
 
scribing the ways in which Roe v. Wade shaped the politics of and popular 
opinion regarding the abortion debate). 
 Unlike the Strickland inquiry, which is not for-
 268. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 269. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). 
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ward-looking and not intended to improve the quality of legal 
representation or to specify particular requirements for ineffec-
tive assistance,270
It may take time for courts and other actors to recognize 
equal protection as a viable basis for vindicating poor defend-
ants’ right to a meaningful defense. One benefit of such a shift, 
however, is that while courts are familiar with the Sixth 
Amendment paradigm and have therefore staked out their po-
sitions and entrenched themselves in bad precedent, equal pro-
tection offers a chance to start from a relatively clean slate. Ul-
timately, courts that incorporate equality principles in this 
context will be able to influence how we think about practical 
aspects of rights enforcement going forward and help to refocus 
solutions on the provision of necessary resources ex ante rather 
than merely evaluating the post hoc results of resource depri-
vation. 
 equal protection is a means not only to pro-
vide prospective guidance regarding the substantive require-
ments for a meaningful defense, but also to acknowledge 
fundamental differences in how the rich and poor are treated in 
the context of criminal defense. Viewing the problem through 
the lens of equal protection, and not just a matter of substan-
tive rights, allows us to focus not just on the quality of lawyer-
ing provided but on how the poor are treated more broadly in 
terms of resources and conditions that may directly or indirect-
ly impede their access to the courts.  
Critics will inevitably declare that regardless of the analy-
sis used, courts will be just as unwilling to determine that some 
resource is required for a meaningful defense and must there-
fore be available to those who cannot otherwise afford it as they 
are to insist that certain resources are critical to ensure a law-
yer’s effectiveness. The same critics may claim that such an ar-
gument puts too much faith in the courts to make decisions 
based on such doctrinal distinctions rather than external facts 
or a guttural feeling about the proper outcome.271
 
 270. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[T]he purpose of 
the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve 
the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable im-
portance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial.”). 
 Legal realists 
may have come by their skepticism honestly, and relying on 
 271. Cf. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Ju-
risprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997) (cataloguing various descriptions 
of legal realism, which emphasize the importance of factors external to the law 
in determining judicial decisions). 
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doctrinal solutions will require judicial acceptance, but the fact 
that indigent defense is an issue so judicial in nature and that 
the judiciary stands as the ultimate protector of political minor-
ities and the otherwise disempowered should prevent us from 
giving up on courts entirely. 
An equal protection approach can serve as a tool in the 
hands of more receptive or sympathetic courts that would oth-
erwise feel burdened by Strickland and other precedent 
grounded in the Sixth Amendment.272 And even if the current 
judiciary is not sympathetic to such claims, its composition is 
“neither static nor permanent.”273 Abandoning the courts alto-
gether as a vehicle for reform is simply not a feasible option for 
defendants subject to such failing systems; given their lack of 
political power to encourage changes by other means—i.e., leg-
islative reform—and the political unpopularity of their cause, 
they have little other recourse.274 Moreover, we would be well 
served to have courts driving indigent defense reform efforts 
rather than the legislative or executive branches, which may 
also be vulnerable to other motivations, such as the need to 
control budgets or to balance indigent defense against other 
state-provided services.275
Moreover, courts are uniquely situated to afford relief in 
the area of indigent defense. They have a high degree of insti-
tutional competence in this context, given their expertise rela-
tive to other branches of government about the workings of the 
 
 
 272. See Ryan Riehl, Note, Double-Talking the Right to Counsel, 50 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1019, 1029 (2004) (“The Court’s willingness to condone such inept con-
duct by lawyers, as falling within the permissible range of professional discre-
tion afforded to defense attorneys, has further entrenched these insurmounta-
ble factors of presumed competence, performance and prejudice into Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 273. Drinan, supra note 3. 
 274. See Sklansky, supra note 10, at 1290 (noting that the “political process 
does a notoriously bad job protecting the rights of criminal defendants” and 
that, therefore, in this context “the presumption is weaker . . . than elsewhere 
that judges should defer to legislative allocations of public resources”). 
 275. See Rodger Citron, Note, (Un) Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Struc-
tural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 498–
99 (1991) (explaining that legislatures are particularly ill-suited to undertake 
indigent defense reform, given its political unpopularity, and that because in-
digent defense is a definitively legal institution, courts are best positioned to 
enact and oversee reform); see also JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 7, at 8 
(2011) (noting that many local governments are “having to choose between 
funding needed services such as health care and human services and uphold-
ing the constitutional commitment to guarantee adequate public defense ser-
vices”). 
  
1266 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1197 
 
indigent defense system.276 And, unlike in other areas—like ed-
ucation or prison conditions—where the judiciary seeks to 
change other institutions, in the area of indigent defense, the 
judiciary is largely self-regulating, alleviating concerns about 
the its ability to effectively direct external institutions toward 
reform.277 Although still one route a court might take, the ap-
proach suggested here does not necessarily require the direc-
tion of legislative appropriations, which is deemed by some 
courts as outside their purview.278 Courts can also control the 
consequences of underfunding by ordering remedies that exist 
wholly within the realm of the judiciary, such as disallowing 
certain consequences (i.e., the imposition of maximum or capi-
tal sentences or the initiation of criminal proceedings) unless 
certain standards—i.e., those generated by an equal protection 
approach—have been met.279
 
 276. See Drinan, supra note 
  
3 (explaining that “judges would be uniquely 
skilled at overseeing the implementation of a revamped public defense sys-
tem,” given their expertise in lawyering); see also Brensike Primus, supra note 
20, at 47 (describing the unique positioning of the federal judiciary with re-
gard to criminal justice reforms and why it is better equipped to redress crim-
inal justice violations than those in other areas, such as education or prison 
conditions).  
Some state courts may also be in a position to adopt standards governing 
indigent defense as a matter of state rule. The Washington Supreme Court re-
cently adopted standards of this sort which, among other things, limit the 
number of cases any public defender in the state may handle. In the Matter of 
the Adoption of New Standards for Indigent Defense and Certification of Com-
pliance, Order No. 25700-A-1004 (Wash. June 15, 2012). 
 277. Such concerns may include the courts’ limited ability to implement 
rulings and the need for political or external support. ROSENBERG, supra note 
10, at 35, 332 (discussing in the context of the right to counsel two of the three 
general constraints he has identified on courts’ ability to produce significant 
social reform: the lack of judicial independence and the judiciary’s lack of im-
plementation powers). Cf. Sklansky, supra note 10, at 1291 (explaining that 
“the distinctive remedial structure of constitutional criminal law” allows 
courts to create remedies within the judicial realm and eliminates the need for 
external enforcement mechanisms, alleviating concerns about the “feasibility 
and political acceptability” of such mechanisms). 
 278. Courts are often hesitant to compel legislative appropriations, in part 
because of separation of powers concerns. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 10, at 
1284; see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 130–34 (explaining that sepa-
ration of powers concerns have prevented some courts from fashioning reme-
dies that require the appropriation of funds, either directly or indirectly); Ef-
fectively Ineffective, supra note 25, at 1744–45. 
 279. Because the nature of criminal prosecution involves the active partici-
pation of the judiciary, the enforcement of what David Sklansky has termed 
“quasi-affirmative” rights and systemic rights minimizes concerns about the 
judiciary encroaching on territory properly reserved for the political branches 
of government. See Sklansky, supra note 10, at 1291 (noting that “[t]he steady 
  
2013] RECLAIMING EQUALITY 1267 
 
The path this Article sets out will involve making tough 
choices about which resources are critical to a meaningful de-
fense. But there is nothing preventing courts from making 
those choices;280
 
stream of criminal cases and the normal processes of criminal adjudication . . . 
provide the vehicle for enforcing the rights granted to criminal suspects and 
criminal defendants”); see, e.g., Lavallee v. Justices in Hamden Superior 
Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 901 (Mass. 2004) (ordering, if counsel was not availa-
ble to provide representation within a specified time frame, that criminal de-
fendants be released or that charges be dismissed). Sklansky suggests that 
one way to promote the enforcement of quasi-affirmative rights—rights that 
obligate the government to do something, but only if the government first 
takes action against the holder of the right (i.e., charging the holder with a 
crime)—is for courts to set substantive rules that can be overridden by the leg-
islature and thereby encourage an inter-branch dialogue that can lead to 
stronger enforcement of constitutional criminal rights. Sklansky, supra note 
 courts need to overcome their hesitance to 
make normative judgments about the rights to which the poor 
are entitled. Equal protection provides an opportunity—if 
courts are willing to seize it—to not only provide the substan-
tive guidance that has been missing from Sixth Amendment ju-
risprudence about what a meaningful defense should entail, 
but also recognize present inequities and ensure that both rich 
and poor are in a position to benefit from substantive rights en-
forcement. 
10, at 1234, 1294. Without getting into the wisdom of such an approach, it is 
also possible that, as in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. (Brown II), 349 
U.S. 294 (1955), courts could endorse more general principles of equality and 
allow the other branches to meet that end. 
 280. Even if the Supreme Court is unwilling to expand its application of 
the Griffin principle, state courts can construe state constitutional provisions 
to apply more broadly than their federal constitutional counterparts. There-
fore, the expanded application of the Griffin-Douglas right is fertile ground for 
state courts to explore—perhaps more so than federal courts, who will ulti-
mately be constrained by the Supreme Court’s direction on this topic. See Jef-
frey, supra note 149, at 254 (explaining that states are free to “guarantee more 
expansive equal protection than that provided by federal law” and that twen-
ty-one of forty eight states that specifically guarantee equal protection in their 
own state constitutions have explicitly held that the scope of that protection is 
broader than that provided under federal law). 
